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A central concern in the study of world politics today is the
relationship between the developed capitalist countries and under¬
developed former colonial countries. The relationship is characterized
by efforts of the underdeveloped countries to improve their condition
vis-a-vis the developed countries, and by efforts of the developed coun¬
tries to maintain their dominance in the relationship. The developed
countries include North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and
Israel. The underdeveloped countries include those in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America. There is both an economic and a political dimension to
the relationship which multinational corporations have been instrumental
in shaping. Not only have they historically conducted the trade between
the two worlds, they have also been instrumental in shaping the political
destinies of underdeveloped countries. In colonial times, the Charter
Companies supplied administrators for the colonies who ruled the terri¬
tories directly. Today there are frequent revelations of American based
multinationals financing political campaigns in foreign countries and
taking steps to overthrow governments. Gulf Oil Corporation’s contri¬
butions to sustaining the Park Chung Hee dictatorship in South Korea and
the International Telephone and Telegraph efforts to destabilize the
Allende government in Chile are two recent examples of multinational
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corporate involvement in the domestic political affairs of foreign coun¬
tries.^ These involvements suggest that multinationals today are seeking
to maintain the same political control that their predecessors once
exercised—only more indirectly.
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the political activity of
American based multinational oil corporations in Mexico, Venezuela, and
Cuba. It will answer the question: Was political control an objective
of the firms? Political control exists in any situation where the oil
companies largely determine who the national leadership will be and/or
the policies adopted by that leadership. Although political control and
political domination will be used interchangeably here, it is understood
that political control is exercised differently today than it was during
colonial times. Direct rule has given way to indirect rule wherein per¬
sons loyal to the interests of foreigners rule many underdeveloped coun-
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tries. Kwame Nkrumah has described this "neo-colonial" political domi¬
nation as a situation in which the decision making options of an under¬
developed country’s leadership are severely limited by the fact that the
economic resources are controlled by foreigners. Under these circum¬
stances, the political leaders must receive the support of foreigners
^Repeated accounts of American corporate and governmental involve¬
ment in the domestic affairs of both Chile and South Korea appeared in
the New York Times and other media during 197^ and 1975.
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For the best account of Nkrumah’s views and his analysis of the
neo-colonial situation, see Kwame Nkrumah, Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah
(New York: International Publishers, 1969), and Kwame Nkrumah, Neo¬
colonialism The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York: International
Publishers, 1966).
3
before they can undertake any initiatives requiring the reallocation of
national resources. It is by this means and the subversion of the
leadership selection process that foreign business interests control the
governments of underdeveloped countries. It is towards analyzing this
phenomena that this thesis directs itself.
The question raised by this thesis grows out of the concern among
students of international relations about how the relationship between
developed capitalist countries and underdeveloped countries came about,
and what it is. The point of departure of this thesis is the notion
that the relationship developed with the expansion of international
capitalism which gave rise to the present situation in which the econo¬
mies of underdeveloped countries respond more to the interests of the
developed countries than to their own, and concurrently, the political
leadership of many underdeveloped countries respond in the same fashion.
Stated otherwise, the central thesis of this paper is that economic
exploitation and political domination develop along parallel and inter¬
connected lines with economic incentives providing the motivation for
both developments.
A wealth of evidence has been generated over the last decade to
substantiate the exploitative nature of the relationship. Andre Gunder
Frank^ has done an excellent job of analyzing the effects of international
capital on underdeveloped countries. He advances several conclusions and
the evidence to support them which show that: (1) Underdevelopment is
See "The Development of Underdevelopment," in Andre Gunder Frank's
Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1970). Also see "Capitalist Development of Underdevelopment in
Chile," and "Capitalist Development of Underdevelopment in Brazil," in
Frank's Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin /^erica (New York: Month¬
ly Review Press, 1969).
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not a normal stage preceding development, but rather a condition growing
out of contact with international capital; (2) Improvements in under¬
developed countries have not and will hot result from the "diffusing"
of ideas and capital from the developed, countries, and can only be done
by breaking away from them; (3) Underdeveloped countries are characterized
internally by the same structural characteristics common to the structure
of international capitalism. The so-called "modern cities" have developed
because wealth is exported from the so-called "backwards rural areas" to
the cities from which a large portion of it is exported to the metropoles
(developed capitalist countries); (4) Underdevelopment has not resulted
from the survival of "archaic" economic and political institutions, or
even from a lack of wealth generating resources, but rather from the
imposition of capitalist structures and institutions, and the export of
wealth.
Other writers have shared Frank's conception of the relationship
between development and underdevelopment. Samir Amin^ has analyzed the
unequal levels of technical sophistication achieved by each type of
country and concluded that the absence of advanced technology in areas
such as Latin America, Asia, and Africa was contrived by the developed
countries. He also shows how this difference has given rise to a system
of "specialization" which casts the underdeveloped countries into the
role of supplier of low cost raw materials. The developed countries
^See "The Transition to Peripheral Capitalism" and "The Develop¬
ment of Peripheral Capitalism: The Development of Underdevelopment,"
in Samir Amin, Accumulation on A World Scale. Vol. I (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1975)•
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process them into high cost finished products which are then resold to
the underdeveloped areas. Pierre Jalee^ has also shown that this is no
accidental arrangement. He demonstrates that modern multinationals are
the descendents of the colonial charter companies which dominated the
economies of the colonies. Both have closely held their technology and
2
wealth. Jalee has also shown that the underdeveloped areas are the
reservoir of raw materials needed to feed the industrial machinery—and
by extension the economies—of the developed area.
3
George Beckford has noted that the root cause of the suffering in
underdeveloped countries is their association with the capitalist West.
He points to the fact that the economies of underdeveloped countries
have become so structured as to primarily serve the needs of international
capital which is headquartered in the Western countries. His evidence is
the hegemony of foreign owned export industries, the development of export
mono-crop economies, and the dependence on imported manufactured products
which characterize underdeveloped countries. Walter Rodney makes the
same case against the developed countries and describes the overall re¬
lationship as the deliberate and systematic exploitation of underdeveloped
^See Pierre Jalee, The Pillage of the Third World (New York: Month¬
ly Review Press, 1968).
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See Jalee*s The Third World in World Economy (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1969).
3
For a presentation of Professor Beckford's complete thesis, see
George Beckford, Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation
Economies of the Third World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).
^See Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington,
D. C.: Howard University Press, 1974).
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areas. Susan Bodenheimer^ has labelled the situation as an effort by
the developed countries to create a system of dependency within which
the underdeveloped countries are prevented from developing since develop¬
ment would lessen the control which imperialism (international capital)
has on them.
Developed capitalist countries are characterized by private owner¬
ship of the means of production, and the concentration of wealth into
the hands of a minority of the people. No study of the relationship
between developed capitalist countries and underdeveloped countries can
be complete without considering the role of the largest holders of pri-
2
vate wealth—corporations. Christopher T. Rand has concluded that
multinational corporations determine the content of a developed country's
policies towards underdeveloped countries. He based his conclusion on
an analysis of the activities of the major international oil companies
operating in the Middle East and American policy towards the region.
Among his findings was that the American Government sponsored the 1954
overthrow of the Iranian nationalist government, and supported the mon-
archial dictatorships in the area because it was in the interest of the
oil companies to do so. The countries of the Middle East are charac¬
terized by wealthy ruling elites and mass poverty.
See Susan Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of
Latin American Underdevelopment," in Readings in U. S. Imperialism. K. T.
Fann and Donald Hodges, eds. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).
2
See Christopher T. Rand, Making Democracy Safe for Oil: Oilmen
and the Islamic East. (New Yorkl Simon and Schuster, 1975). See es-
pecially Chapter Two, "A Couple of Rounds in Washington." Also see,
Michael Tanzer, "The International Oil Companies and Their Home Govern¬
ments: A Basic Symbiosis," in The Political Economy of International Oil
and the Underdeveloped Countries (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).
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Harvey O'Connor^ studied the same firms within the context of some
of the major political developments of this century. Among the events
studied were the Russian Revolution and World War II. He found, for
example, that Standard Oil of New Jersey constantly manuevered through¬
out the period just after the Russian Revolution to replace British oil
interests in the Soviet oil fields. This was being done at the same
time that other Western interests were seeking to overthrow the Soviet
Government, O'Connor also points to the fact that this same company
sold Nazi Germany' petroleum products right up to the time the United
States entered World War II even though these supplies were helping Hitler
conquer American allies in Europe, O'Connor concludes that this indi¬
cates that the major international oil companies constantly seek to serve
their own interests even if friends of the United States must suffer.
2
Michael Tanzer had documented the same phenomena in underdeveloped
countries. His analysis of multinational oil company behavior in India,
Iraq and Mexico clearly reveals that these firms have developed a variety
of techniques to inhibit a country from developing along lines which are
not in the companies* best interests. One of the most potent weapons
the firms use according to Tanzer is the oil boycott. The boycott is
See Harvey O'Connor, World Crisis in Oil (New York: Monthly Re¬
view Press, 1962) and The Empire of Oil (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1955)• Both these works are important contributions to the study
of multinational oil company behavior.
2
Michael Tanzer, "Major Issues: Oil Exploration in the Under¬
developed Countries—Public vs. Private" and "India: A Case Study in
the Political Economy of International Oil," in The Political Economy
of International Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1969)*
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designed to deny a developing country the basic ingredient necessary for
growth, energy, Tanzer notes that the boycott was instituted against
Cuba for doing precisely the same thing that Japan, Italy, and a number
of other developed capitalist countries were doing—purchasing Soviet
crude oil. The implication of Tanzer's analysis is that underdeveloped
countries are punished for taking any initiative which may result in
weakening the control which the oil firms have over them. India, Tanzer
observes, decided not to accept sizeable shipments of Soviet crude after
she saw what happened to Cuba.
The oil boycott is a desperate measure and is usually only imposed
after all other methods of control (political and economic) have been
rendered useless. Richard J, Barnett and Ronald E. Muller^ have detailed
the operational conditions most preferred by the companies. They outline
how raw materials are mined by one branch of the firm, given initial
processing by a second, transported to the metropoles for final proces¬
sing by a third, processed into consummable finished products by a
fourth, and remarketed in the underdeveloped country by a fifth. Barnett
and Muller use oil, food, electronics and a number of other kinds of
corporations for their study and amply demonstrate that this practice is
common to all privately owned multinationals headquartered in the de¬
veloped capitalist countries. At each step in the process prices are
manipulated to avoid taxes, tariffs, and royalty payments so that profits
can be maximized. These manipulations require operating conditions under
^See chapters 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 in Barnett and Muller, Global
Reach; The Power of The Multinational Corporations (New York: Simon
Schuster, 1974).
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which the firms are unhampered by nationalist demands for a greater share
in the profits of the firms. Such demands can take the form of tariff
restrictions, production quotas, increased royalty terms, and even
nationalizations. When demands take this form, the system of trading
through subsidiaries loses much of its profitability. Nationalizations
are especially threatening to the firms since they indicate that the firms
are losing political control within the country. The best operating con¬
ditions for the firms exists when the government of an underdeveloped
country is under the control of the companies, and/or is not nationalis¬
tic.
This thesis will analyze the efforts of the American oil companies
to control the governments of the three countries studied. It will at
all times place the political activities of the firms within the context
of their economic motivations. Further, given the nature of the rela¬
tionship between the firms and their home government, it can be expected
that whatever political initiatives the firms have untaken, they have had
the support of the American Government. It will be essential, to deter¬
mine if this was the case in these three instances. The scope and
methodology of this analysis is a case study of Mexico, Venezuela, and
Cuba. The research began with a study of the histories of the three
countries and of the American oil industry. It was in this step that
the significant political developments of each country was identified;
it was also in this phase that the operational character of the oil in¬
dustry became understood. Each country is credited by historians^ with
^An informative history of the Mexican Revolution can be found in
Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution; Genesis Under Madero (Austin;
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having undergone a revolution. Mexico’s revolution occurred between
1910 and 1920. Venezuela’s revolution is commonly referred to as the
Venezuelan Democratic Revolution and it occurred in two parts: Part I
from 1945 to 19^ and Part II from 1958 to I960. The Cuban Revolution
occurred between 1956 and 1961.
Although each revolution represented a reaction against repression
and exploitation, they are highly distinguishable from one another. In
Mexico, the classic class divisions existed but the revolution was not
articulated in terms of class struggle. In fact the landlords succeeded
in winning the initiative from the workers and peasants in the fight to
oust the regime they all opposed. These landlords came to be controlled
by the same foreign business interests which had controlled the previous
regime. Therefore, when the revolution was finished the same exploita¬
tive economic structures remained. The only change was in the names of
the people operating them.
Venezuela’s class divisions were equally prominant. But unlike
Mexico, the classes did not organize as classes or in any other large
scale manner to overthrow the dictatorship. The first part of the
Venezuelan Democratic Revolution began with a coup d’etat which ousted
the military dictatorship and installed the first civilian regime in
University of Texas Press, 1952), and Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolu¬
tion 1910-1914 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968). For a use¬
ful history of the Venezuelan Revolution, see Robert J, Alexander, The
Venezuelan Democratic Revolution (New Brunswick, N.J,: Rutgers University
Press, 1964), and Glen L. Kolb, Democracy and Dictatorship in Venezuela.
1945-1958 (New London: Connecticut College Press, 1974). For a history
of the Cuban Revolution see Boris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and
Latin America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965)> and Gilberto V.
Fort, The Cuban Revolution: An Annotated Bibliography (Lawrence: Uni¬
versity of Kansas Libraries, 1969)*
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Venezuela’s history. For this reason it is called a democratic revolu¬
tion. The junior military officers who led the coup surrendered power
to a coalition of civilian and military interests who immediately earned
the suspicion of the foreign oil companies by talking of nationalizing
the oil industry and in fact raising the companies’ royalty commitments
to fifty percent of the oil profits. Within months after the first
elections in the country's history were held, and an all civilian govern¬
ment assumed power, it was overthrown and replaced by the most brutal
military dictatorship in the country's history. It was during these next
nine years that the masses organized. In 1958 the civilians returned
to power (a 1 though as a democratic rather than as a class based movement.
For this reason, the structural characteristics of the economy also re¬
mained only slightly changed).
Cuba’s revolution was class based. It was, like Mexico's, one in
which the leadership was provided by people who were not members of the
most oppressed class. However, unlike Mexico, the Cuban Revolutionaries
never came under the control of the foreign business interests. And
unlike Venezuela, it was a mass movement from beginning to end. Further,
the Cuban Revolution was conducted in the interests of the peasants and
workers and not simply in the interests of democracy. Significantly,
the economic and political characteristics of the island were changed
by the revolution.
Three countries instead of one or two were studied to increase the
precision of the investigation. The three countries represent a cross
section of relationships an underdeveloped country can have with multi¬
national oil firms and the international oil market. Mexico's oil fields
12
were originally developed to supply the domestic market (albeit a foreign
dominated domestic market)? and although she presently exports petroleum
products, most of her production is still consumed internally. She is,
therefore, an oil producer—consumer. Historically, Venezuela's oil
has primarily serviced the international markets. She is a producer-
exporter. Cuba has never been a significant oil producer. She has,
however, traditionally had the highest per capita oil consumption
level in Latin America. Cuba is an importer-consumer. By viewing the
collective experiences of these countries, it will be possible to advance
precise statements on the political objectives of oil firms in undeveloped
countries.
Several limitations have been imposed on this inquiry in an attempt
to improve its precision, and to keep it manageable. The decision to
study three countries instead of more was made so that more attention
could be given to the uniquenesses of each case study. For that reason,
the conclusions arrived at here do not represent an all encompassing des¬
cription of oil company behavior in every political situation. However,
this thesis's conclusions will be indicative of the companies* behavior
from one type of regime to another, from one decade to another, from
one type of oil market to another, and from one underdeveloped country
to another.
This study is limited to oil company activity because they are the
largest industrial grouping in the Western world (in terms of capital
assets^). Further, international trade in oil between the United States
^Each year Fortune magazine ranks the five hundred largest indus¬
trial and commercial companies operating in the United States. For the
most recent rankings, see Fortune, May, 1975*
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and the underdeveloped countries of Latin America has been going on for
approximately ninety years. Many of the other firms and commodities
in international trade (such as motor vehicles, computers, and modern
weapons) have a much shorter association with international politics.
American oil firms are the only oil firms studied because five of the
seven largest companies^ (Standard Oil of California, Exxon, Texaco,
Gulf, and Mobil) are headquartered in the United States, and a sixth
(Shell) is twenty-five percent owned by American interests. Further, in
each of the countries studied, one or more of the American companies
controlled the oil industry before nationalization.
One other self imposed limitation needs to be noted. The politi¬
cal activities of the firms are studied only as they relate to the
revolutions occurring in each country. This keeps the study manageable
and is not a severe limitation as it may at first appear. During
periods of acute political crisis, such as those represented by revolu¬
tions, formerly hidden political alignments surface. During the Mexican
revolution, for example, the competition between Standard of New Jersey
and Shell surfaced and each company was witnessed openly supporting
their own candidates for President.
It may be argued that revolutionary situations are abnormal and
that the firms' behavior within them do not accurately reflect the nature
of their activities under more normal circumstances. It is out of respect
for this argument that this thesis will not treat the revolution as an
hbid.
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isolated phenomena. The history of each revolution will be carefully
documented together with the oil companies' place in that history. In
this way, the revolutions are analyzed as part of the historical develop¬
ment of each country, and the firms' involvement in the revolutions are
treated as an historical involvement.
At all times the analysis will be kept within the theoretical frame¬
work outlined by Andre Gunder Frank, et al. For instance, it will be
shown how contact with American oil firms contribute to the economic
and political developments of each country. This will be done by analy¬
zing some of the relevant developmental efforts before, during, and
after penetration by the oil firms. Internal structural similarities
with international capital will be also identified. This will be done
by identifying how wealth is exported from one region of a country to
another and thereby developing one region at the expense of another.
In focusing on each country's revolution, the concern has been to
identify the impact of the firms on the outcome. Essential to this
task was an identification of the various political forces and their
alignment vis-a-vis the oil companies and one another. The social
base and programs of each force has been analyzed so that statements
could be advanced concerning the companies' political preferences and
priorities.
CHAPTER II
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION: A CASE STUDY
IN POLITICAL DOMINATION
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to study the role of American oil
firms in the Mexican Revolution, American involvement in Mexico is
inseparably associated with the Mexican Revolution. During the revolu¬
tion, American businesses controlled more of the country*s industry than
at any time before or since. America also intervened in Mexico more
frequently between 1910 and 1920 than at any other time. It was during
the Mexican Revolution that diplomatic relations between the two coun¬
tries were broken for the first and only time in this century. The
involvement of the American Government in Mexico is inseparably associ¬
ated with the involvement of American oil interests in the country. The
largest industries in the country were owned or controlled by the Stan¬
dard Oil group. It was in behalf of these interests that the United
States Government invaded Mexico, The period of the Mexican Revolution
corresponds with the period of the greatest oil output. American oil
companies entered the Mexican Revolution as the second largest producer
in the country and when the Revolution was over they were first. To
accomplish this, the companies manipulated the political machinery of
the country both directly and through the American Government. During
the revolution, the firms did a number of things; first, they challenged
15
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the Mexican people's right to ownership of the subsoil resources. Second,
they maintained the political and economic differences between the
classes by discouraging political reforms and encouraging slavery and
other forms of worker exploitation. Third, they encouraged a develop¬
mental pattern which made Mexico structurally responsive to the needs of
the firms. And, they competed with European and indigenous interests
for control over the political leadership.
To properly understand this dynamic, several issues must be placed
into the proper and relevant perspective. First, the question of public
versus private ownership of the oil had a historical and a legal dimen¬
sion which provided the background for the American oil companies' claims
to the oil. Second, the Mexican Revolution began as a class based move¬
ment with the oil companies firmly aligned with the property owners. It
is necessary to understand the background of these alignments since they
provided the oil companies with the opportunity for controlling the
political leadership of the country. Finally, it is important to iden¬
tify the extent to which the American oil companies controlled the economy
of the country since it was their economic strength which made it pos¬
sible for them to control the political machinery.
Public vs. Private Ownership of the Subsoil
The question of who rightfully owned the subsoil was widely debated
throughout Mexico's history. Until Porfirio Diaz established his dic¬
tatorship in 1881, the answer had consistently been that the Mexican
citizenry as a unit owned all wealth beneath the land surface. In 1526,
when Mexico was known as the Spanish Colony of New Spain, Don Carlos
decreed that subsoil minerals were the property of the Spanish Crown.
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Since all sovereignty rested within the monarchy, the implication was
that subsoil wealth belonged to the royal or national sovereign. Sub¬
sequent to that time Phillip II reinforced sovereign ownership of subsoil
resources by insisting that neither Spanish mercantilist, colonialist,
nor Mexican Indian had a right to mine the subsoil without the express
permission of the Crown. In 1783 Don Carlos III established the Ordenzas
de Araniuez^ as a separate mining law for Mexico. Inherent within its
provisions was the condition that sovereignty resided with the Spanish
Crown and that all mineral resources remained the property of the Spanish
monarch. When the Viceroy of New Spain (Mexico), joined with mutinous
forces and signed the Treaty of Cordoba in 1821—by which Mexican inde¬
pendence was proclaimed—they incorporated provisions which transmitted
all vestiges of sovereignty to the new Mexican nation. Again in 1824
3when the Law of Colonization was passed, foreigners were prohibited
from owning land in certain areas and could not own surface real property
at all unless they were married to a Mexican citizen. The year before,
the Mexican Congress passed regulations requiring foreigners to be
licensed before they could engage in any mining activity even if such
activity was at the request of a Mexican.
Vor a discussion of the history of Mexican mineral laws see Merrill
Rippy, Oil and The Mexican Revolution (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill
Printers, 1972), pp. 1-27.
2
A useful compilation of documents tracing Mexico's legal develop¬
ment can be found in Albert P. Blaustein and Gilbert H. Flanz, eds..
Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Mexico (Dobbs Ferry, New
York: Oceana Publishers, Inc., 1973)*
^Ibid.
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Although subsequent to that time the laws were amended to allow
foreigners to own surface property, national ownership of the subsoil was
explicitly and implicitly upheld. Santa Anna, in 1842, confirmed the
primacy of national interests over foreign interests by decreeing that
foreigners were absolutely subject to Mexican law and that all disputes
involving subsoil claims had to be settled according to Mexican statutes.^
He specifically prohibited foreigners doing business in the country from
using diplomatic channels as a means of bypassing local laws. Juarez
followed suit in 1863 when he sponsored legislation which declared the
2
Ordenanzas still in effect. The only change being that sovereignty
rested in the nation instead of the Spanish Crown. In 1881 the Mexican
Supreme Court validated the Ordenanzas as the legitimate mining law of
Mexico.
The Mexican Supreme Court's decision corresponded with General
Porfirio Diaz's seizure of power and his attempts to invalidate the
Ordenanzas. He had come to power with the apparent support of the gen¬
try who saw repeal of the Ordenanzas as a prerequisite to their enrich¬
ment. No doubt American businessmen were supportive of this development
since Mexico's gold and silver regions were attractive investment oppor¬
tunities. Diaz's ultimate surrender of the public's claims to the sub¬
soil was intended to benefit the Creole gentry who owned most of the
land. However, they lacked the technology and the markets needed to
^Ibid.
2
Walter V. Sholes provides a useful account of nationalist efforts
to control the activities of foreign investors in Mexico during the nine¬
teenth century in Mexican Politics During the Juarez Regime (Columbia,
Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1969).
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fully exploit the opening. They, therefore, turned to miners such as
Guggenheim, oilmen such as Edward L. Doheny, and railroad builders such
as A. A. Robinson. Obviously, the foreigners had the strongest bargain¬
ing hand since the Creoles' minerals were relatively useless without
outside help. Due to their relative weakness, the Creoles were forced
to grant concessions favorable to the foreigners. For example, the oil
companies received the right to expropriate land which they felt helped
oil. The rate of compensation was based upon how much oil was produced.
Since most of the land was either not explored or was not productive,
large tracts of land lay fallow. There were at least two consequences
to this development: First, the opportunity was provided for the oil
companies and the other foreign interests to take control of the country.
Second, it was the oil companies who now could claim ownership of the
subsoil.
American oil companies first entered Mexico in substantial numbers
after 1900. And by 1905» they had launched a full scale attack on the
Ordenanzas and the principle of public ownership of the soil. Liberals
saw public ownership of the subsoil as the best source for financing
reforms. The oil companies argued that subsoil wealth never belonged to
the people and that sovereign ownership of the subsoil applied only to
the Spanish Crown, They further argued that once Mexico claimed inde¬
pendence the principle of subsoil ownership became inoperative, and that
the 1884 mining code was simply an acknowledgement of that fact. In
response, the Mexican Academy of Jurisprudence issued an interpretation
of the 1884 mining code in which they concluded that the oilmen's rights
were granted by the government. The implication was that any right so
granted could also be withdrawn.
20
Nationalists in the Mexican Congress attempted to out-flank the
oil companies by proposing legislation which would have required the
companies to have their concessions revalidated periodically. During
the revalidation proceeding the Government would have had the right to
cancel concessions of companies who were found to have committed fraud
or had failed to perform in the interest of Mexico. Standard reflected
the attitude of the companies when it attacked the proposal:
As early as 1905» Mexican radicals bethought themselves a
simple way to acquire the oil which the foreigners had
brought into production in Mexico. . . . Had they succeeded,
they would with one stroke have robbed the foreign oil
companies of the fruit of their toil.^
The legislation was defeated because the oil companies appealed
directly to Diaz. Diaz was persuaded that if the proposal was made
into law the companies would abandon Mexico. Some years (1913) later
Standard Oil of New Jersey published a pamphlet called "The Fine Art of
Squeezing'^ in which this episode was described as a classic example of
how oil companies could force Governments to compromise.
Class Basis of the Mexican Revolution
Spanish colonialism had installed a caste system in Mexico which
effectively insured that the Mestizo and Indian majority would never be
any thing but a labor reserve for the Creole gentry. However, when the
gentry wanted to break away from Spain and establish an independent
republic they found it necessary to raise an army from among the Indian
^Quoted in John Kenneth Turner, Barbarous Mexico (Austin; Univer¬
sity of Texas Press, 1969), p. 18.
2
The Fine Art of Squeezing (New York: Standard Oil Corporation
of New Jersey, 1913), p« 2.
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and Mestizo peasants. The Creoles promised the peasants equal politi¬
cal freedom and issued a document guaranteeing these rights. The Acta
del Ayuntamiento de Mexico^ was the country*s first guarantee of equal
protection under the law. However, soon after it was issued in 1808, the
rebellion was defeated and remnants of the rebel army fled to the moun¬
tains to escape the Spanish troops. From there they continued to operate
and the promise of political freedom was repeated in the Elementos
2
Constitutionales which was issued in 1811. It called for abolition of
the monarchy, racism, and church ownership of land. The constitution
also established a republic and separated church and state power with
the state being dominant.
Just before national independence was won in 1814, the first Con¬
stitutional Congress was held. It drew up a constitution which incor¬
porated the provisions of the Elementos Constitutionales and guaranteed
universal suffrage. It was also careful not to concentrate power into
the hands of one man and provided for a three-man executive branch. In
order to insure that the right of the Indians and Mestizos was clearly
spelled out, a Bill of Rights was added. Finally, it provided for a
popularly elected congress. When Mexico declared herself independent
on November 6, 1814, this constitution went into effect.
Spain dispatched Colonel Augustine de Iturbide and an army to
reclaim Mexico. Iturbide joined forces with the Mexican gentry, how¬
ever. Later he declared himself to be the emperor of the country and
^Blaustein and Flanz, eds.. Constitutions.
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abolished the republican government. Supporters of the Republic rallied
around Santa Anna and Iturbide was overthrown on March 17» 1823. In less
than one year a new constitution was issued which was modeled after the
United States' Constitution.
It did not take long, however, for class antagonisms to erode the
rights won by the Indian and Mestizo majority. The Creole gentry and
the clergy encouraged Santa Anna to abolish the federal system, the
Congress, and all elected State officials. This was done to keep the
peasant majority from using the electoral machinery to prevent the church
and the landlords from expanding their holdings. Significantly, this move
came at about the same time as the first railroad concessions were being
awarded to foreigners, and suggests that at the time the gentry and
clergy identified the masses as a greater threat than the foreigners.
However, the fact that Santa Anna manuevered to minimize foreign activity
in Mexico, suggests also that the gentry saw the potential for foreign
domination.
The railroads made it possible for farmers in the interior to ship
crops to market anywhere in the world. The possibility of enriching
themselves in this world wide market no doubt played a large part in the
gentry’s decision to admit the railroad builders. However, transporta¬
tion and markets were only two of the requirements; two others were
land and labor. Subsistence farming as practiced by the peasant major¬
ity would have to be replaced by large scale plantation farming. And
the peasants themselves would be needed to work the plantations. Neither
their land nor their labor could be co-opted as long as they exercised
the same political rights as the Creoles. Hence, the encouragement of
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Santa Anna to abolish the democratic system and admit the foreigners.
When Benito Juarez came to power he attempted to reinstate the
political rights of the peasants. The Ley Juarez^ once again limited
church ownership of land since the Catholic Church had become the
largest feudal landowner in the country. It also ended the church’s
and the military’s authority to prosecute people in their private courts.
It ended corporate land ownership; and reinstated the federal system.
Juarez was very popular among the masses, and this popularity effectively
prohibited the gentry and clergy from raising a strong opposition move¬
ment against him. They therefore appealed to the French Government for
help.
Although the French army was able to conquer Mexico and occupy
her for five years, Juarez remained the de facto leader of the Indian
and Mestizo majority. And in 186? Juarez returned to power and rein¬
stated the statutes which guaranteed the peasants political freedoms
and which limited private wealth. He could not, however, fully reverse
the growth of the feudal economy and when he left office his successors
did not even try. Juarez’s successor between 1876 and 1911 was General
Porfirio Diaz. It was during the Diaz dictatorship that slavery was
introduced.
Just as Diaz had surrendered public ownership of the subsoil for
the benefit of the gentry, he allowed slavery to be practiced for the
same reason. In regions where subsoil minerals were found, the Indian
inhabitants were either driven off, killed, or enslaved and sent to work
^Rippy, Oil and the Mexican Revolution.
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the plantations and minesJ The Creoles* wealth was rooted in the
plantation syston and it was they who used most of the slave labor.
Cotton and henequen (cash crops) replaced corn and beans (food crops)
as the main agricultural products. The cash crops were then exported
to the international textile markets. Slave labor was ideally suited
for this kind of enterprise.
Although oil production is a capital intensive enterprise, and
although the American oil companies in Mexico imported much of the labor
it needed from the United States, the American companies became the
chief beneficiaries of the slave system. Standard Oil, for example,
purchased half of the slave grown henequen crops through its subsidi¬
ary American Cordage Trust. On one plantation alone in Yucatan, there
were between one hundred thousand and one hundred and twenty-five thou¬
sand slaves. American Cordage was the chief purchaser of the henequen
produced there. In this manner the American oil firms came to dominate
the agricultural sector of the Mexican economy.
Control over oil and agriculture were ultimately translated into
control over other sectors of the economy. The Mexican National Bank,
and the Mexican National Railroad came under Standard Oil control. This
gave it control over agriculture, petroleum, transportation and financing.
Additionally, other Americans gained positions of hegemony in the econo¬
my. The country’s largest newspaper, the Mexican Herald, was American
owned. One American owned four million acres in Durango and Chihuahua.
Another accumulated twelve million acres between I89O and 1910. A third
Hurner, Barbarous Mexico.
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owned most of the state of Oaxaca. By 1910, Americans owned two-thirds
of all industry in Mexico.^
The American position was strengthened by the 1905 decision of the
United States Government to value the peso against gold, which was in
short supply in Mexico, instead of silver, which was more available and
which had been the traditional standard against which the peso was
valued. The transition to a cash crop export economy had left the coun¬
try dependent on imports for much of its foodstuffs and machinery. The
devaluation of the peso meant that the Creole gentry got paid less for
its exports, but had to pay more for imports. As a result, a number of
Creoles became financially pressed. Some turned to the National Bank
for relief. Those who could not repay their loans had their properties
confiscated by the same Americans who already dominated the economy.
Diaz was powerless to change the situation in view of the power of
the American interests led by the oil companies. This impotency frus¬
trated many of his supporters and an opposition among the Creoles built
up. This opposition was, however, confined to electoral challenges.
The Mexican Creoles were led by Francisco Madero, the Creole land
owner who campaigned against Diaz in the 1905 and 1910 elections. Capi¬
talizing on the dissatisfaction created by the country's economic con¬
ditions, Madero won wide support by calling for reforms. Diaz however
controlled the electoral machinery and had used it to revalidate his
dictatorship in every election since 1881. Despite his failures at the
polls, Madero remained opposed to the workers* donands for an armed
^Stephen Glissold, Latin America; New World Third World (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 85.
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revolution. In 1907 he declared that such a course would do "more evil
to the country than the bad government we have".^
The working class was made up of factory workers, teachers, domes¬
tic servants, railroad workers, dock workers, and those miners who were
not enslaved. Their condition was little better than that of the peas¬
ants and their efforts to get better wages and working conditions were
brutally repressed. Child labor, seven day work weeks, thirteen hour
work days, and perpetual debt to the company stores were the norm. On
June 1, 1906, workers at William C. Greene's Consolidated Copper Company,
an Anaconda subsidiary, struck when they were denied the same wage
increase that had just been given to the plant's American employees. The
strikers also demanded an eight hour work day, a minimum wage, and a
merit system to govern hiring and firing. Greene sent to the United
States for help in breaking the strike while tooops were being sent from
Mexico city. Under the command of the Arizona Rangers, two hundred and
seventy-five armed volunteers responded. Although the strike had ended
by the time the volunteers arrived, approximately one hundred of the
workers were killed in retaliation for striking. The Diaz appointed
Governor of the territory endorsed the killings and threatened to send
future strikers south into Sonora to fight Indians.
That same year strikes occurred throughout Mexico and each was
violently repressed. In November, for instance, workers at an American
owned cotton plantation had their wages cut after the company's profits
declined. A strike ensued. Diaz sent in the Army to crush it and out¬
lawed all future strikes. Strikes continued, however, and in January
hbid.
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1907» between twenty and thirty thousand workers were laid off by their
employers in retaliation for employee wage and benefit demands. A
demonstration at a company store in Rio Blanco was repressed and forty-
nine workers killed. The issue was excessively high prices charged by
the store. By the Spring of 1908, the strikes were sufficiently well
organized to completely paralyze the Mexican National Railroads. In
early 1909» the strikers were beginning to get results and the railroad
officials announced plans to upgrade some of the Mexican employees. The
plan was dropped, however, when American employees of the firm struck
against it.
The workers' movement was spearheaded by the Mexican Liberal Party
(PLM).^ PLM exploited the nationalist sentiments of the people by
identifying the foreign investors as the source of Diaz's strength. It
also identified the class basis of the people's condition by pointing
to the difference in the privileges of the Indians, workers, the Creole
gentry and the foreigners. PLM called for unity among workers and
peasants? universal, free, and secular education, and an end to child
labor. Its program also demanded higher wages; a minimum wage; an eight
hour work day; indemnification for work related accidents; an end to
forced Sunday work; and abolition of the company store. PLM demanded
that all workers' debts to the company be cancelled, and that a program
of land reform be started. On the question of oil the Party had its
supporters in the Mexican Congress propose legislation which would have
required the oil companies to apply for revalidation of their concessions
^James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolu¬
tion (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968), pp. 20-50 passim.
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from time to time. Where it was found that a company had not lived up
to the agreement, or had acted illegally in some way, the concession
could be revoked, PLM declared itself committed to armed revolution
to accomplish its goals.
The peasants were Mexico’s most oppressed class. They were pri¬
marily Indians who were either enslaved or were forced to work for sub¬
sistence wages. During the period when the foreigners expanded their
hold on the Mexican economy, the living conditions of the peasants
steadily declined. Between the year Diaz issued the mining statutes
(1884) giving ownership over the subsoil to the surface owner, and the
year that the revolution began (19101*. fifty percent of the peasant popu-
*
lation were forced off their land and into the cities*aThose who did
not go into the cities were forced to move into the mountainous areas
which were unsuited for farming, mining, and oil production. As a
—
result, peasant food crops such as maize and beans^ deaT.ined by twenty
and twenty-five percent, respectivel/T^ Imports from*'Amei:ica were
offered as substitutes for the peasant diet. However, imports could
only be purchased with currency, and currency could only be gotten
through wages. By this process the peasants were "recruited" into the
wage system.
The primary slave markets were in mining and plantation farming.
Both sectors were especially brutal. American miners refused to pay
their laborers in cash and issued script instead. This script was only
redeemable at the company stores where prices averaged a minimum of
^Glissold, Latin America, p. 86.
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seventy-five percent^ higher than in non-company stores. Workers were
allowed credit at the company store and on pay day the owner would
simply deduct what the laborer owed. Many laborers remained in per¬
petual debt. As long as a worker was in debt he could not legally quit
his job. When such workers were no longer suited for the rigors of mine
work, the owner could sell him to "recover" the amount owed. Plantations
were among the chief purchasers of surplus mine and Indian labor. The
2
price of this slave labor ranged from $65 to $1,000.
One of the largest Creole slave owners was Olegaio Molina, a close
personal friend of President Diaz. Molina owned a fifteen million acre
henequen plantation in Yucatan. The henequen was worked by a slave
labor force of 8,000 Yaqui Indians; 3»000 Chinese and Korean indentured
servants; and between one hundred thousand and one hundred and twenty-
3
five thousand Mayan slaves. When Diaz granted Molina the Yucatan con¬
cession, he allowed him to simply enslave the entire local population
of Mayans. The Yaqui slaves were among those who had declared war on the
Creoles and whites but had been captured. The product of this slave
labor was sold to the Standard Oil Subsidiary, American Cordage Trust.
American oil companies, then, encouraged the oppression of tens
of thousands of Indians. The Indians' work day began at 3s^5 a.m. and
extended well into the following night. They were assigned severe





production quotas and those who did not meet them were either whipped,
had their food rations cut, or both. At night they were kept in high
walled, guarded enclosures. They were not allowed any contact whatever
with relatives and friends. This was done in an unsuccessful attempt
to keep word of inside conditions from leaking out. Other Indians did
learn of the fate of their enslaved brothers, however, and chose suicide
rather than captivity. Colonel Francisco B. Cruz, a Creole Army officer
who earned extra money trading in captured Indians, confessed to an
American in 1908 that:
Those Indians wanted to cheat me out of my commissions money
and so they threw their children into the sea and jumped in
after them.^
Many Indians chose to fight, however, and created such a problem
for the Government and businessmen that a bounty was placed on their
heads. A Mexican Army doctor admitted that:
Every soldier who kills a Yaqui is paid a reward of one
hundred dollars. To prove his feat the soldier must show
the ears of the victim.2
A number of Indians escaped this fate by joining bands of "bandits” headed
by such revolutionary figures as Pancho Villa and Emilio Zapata. Villa
and Zapata became popular among the masses, and during the revolution
both fielded armies of several thousand peasant fighters.
Those peasants who migrated into the cities to join the work
force found the life there was not much better than in the country side.




hundred saloons. One effect of this was that between 1877 and 1900 food
consumption declined and tequila consumption increased. The cities only
offered hovels for the peasant to live in. The combined effects of mal¬
nutrition and unsanitary surroundings had some predictable effects: the
death rate among live-born babies was 44 percent in their first year,
and the average peasant only lived to reach age thirty. There was little
opportunity for improvement through education, and employment. The
schools could accommodate only one child in three and that one was
usually from the upper classes. One indicator of the esteem with which
the regime held public education is the fact that elementary school
teachers were paid at the same rate as domestic servants, and the total
national budget for education was twenty cents per citizen.^ By 1900
one half of the population had migrated into the cities where there was
very little work. It was from among these dissatisfied workers and
peasants that the revolution gained its best supportees.
The Structure of Underdevelopment
Andre Gunder Frank has described the structure of underdevelopment
as a condition in which the relationship between different regions of
an underdeveloped country relate to one another in much the same way as
underdeveloped countries in general relate to developed capitalist
countries. Amin, Beckford, and Jalee are among a group of progressive
economists who have described the underdeveloped countries' economies as
so structured as to serve the interests of the developed countries. In
Mexico certain regions were underdeveloped for the benefit of other
^Glissold, Latin America, pp. 84-86.
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regions. American oil companies, headed by Standard Oil of New Jersey
played a decisive role in bringing this condition about.
The American railroad men and miners who preceded the oil companies
into Mexico set a process in motion which not only necessitated the ar¬
rival of the oil firms but also created the conditions under which the
oilmen could achieve hegemony. Mining gold and silver in the Mexican
interior presented a problem of safety and of efficiently transporting
minerals to market. Mountains, rivers, and forests were formidable
obstacles for mule teams and wagons to cross with loads of supplies and
ore. The obvious prerequisite for commercial production of gold and
silver production in regions far removed from the refineries was to
expand the rail system to include these regions.
Expansion of the rail system presented additional problems, how¬
ever, which only the oil companies could solve. The steam engines used
in Mexico prior to 1900 were inefficient in comparison with the oil
fueled trains being used by the Santa Fe Railroad. Edward L. Doheny had
been instrumental in the Santa Fe's conversion to oil fueled engines,
and in I9OO the American owners of the Mexican National Railroad invited
him to do the same for them. Doheny was specifically requested to go
into commercial oil production in Mexico and provide a reliable source
of energy for the railroad. Doheny was associated with Standard Oil of
New Jersey. It was the technological superiority which Standard was
able to bring to bear, together with the availability of a dependent
market which gave the American oil firms their competitive edge in
Mexico.
Doheny concentrated his efforts in the region where oil was already
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known to exist. For years people had been taking oil from open shafts
and mines. However, this level of technology was not suited to com¬
mercial production and it was not long before the Doheny-Standard com¬
bination held the advantage. The decision to center their efforts in the
region where oil was known to exist proved to be an important decision
for the Americans because over the next thirty years ninety percent of
all oil produced in the country came from an area within twenty-five
!
square miles of that point. The first well which Doheny sank was on
the Hacienda del Tulillo which he had purchased for $325,000.^ The
hacienda comprised 280,000 oil rich acres and was acquired from a finan¬
cially pressed Creole. By 1904, 220,000 barrels per year were being
produced. By 1910 production had reached 14 million barrels and Doheny
was earning in excess of one million dollars per week. The phenomenal
profits being made by Doheny and Standard Oil did two things; First,
it provided the funds with which the American oilmen could take control
of other sectors of the economy, (see Chart 1) Second, it motivated
others to invade Mexico in search of wealth.
Standard's use of her strong economic position provides a classic
study in intranational structural underdevelopment. American Cordage
Trust, a Standard subsidiary, was the largest exporter of slave produced
cotton and henequen. Chart 2 outlines the manner in which this trade
stimulated underdevelopment in various parts of the country.
The structural underdevelopment permeated every sector of the
economy and every region of the country. American Cordage claimed fifty
2
percent of all cotton and henequen produced in Mexico. Large plantations
^Ludwell Denny, We Fight for Oil (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
1928), p. 45.
2Leonard M. Fanning, Foreign Oil and the Free World (New York;
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CHART 1
COMPANIES AND SECTORS CONTROLLED BY STANDARD OIL
OF NEW JERSEY IN 1910
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CHART 2
STRUCTURE OF MEXICO'S INTRANATIONAL EXPORT ECONOMY: 1881-1910
The United States imports raw
materials and exports manu¬
factured products and tra¬
ders (multinationals)
Mexico developed a capitalist
economy. It was the seat of
foreign activity in the country.
Branches of the foreign busines¬
ses located there and gave the
outward impression that the city
was benefitting from interna¬
tional capitalism. However, be¬
tween 1881 and 1910 there were
high rates of unemployment, and
starvation. This was due to the
export of raw materials, i.e.,
henequen in favor of local pro¬
cessing.
Yucatan developed a feudal economy owing
to the concentration of land into large
plantations owned by a few families. Its
primary crop was henequen which was pro¬
duced with slave labor. Yucatan develop¬
ed at the expense of slave exporting
regions such as Sonora. It failed to
fully develop, however, because its pri¬
mary resource was exported.
The economy of Sonora failed to develop
because its primary resource was ex¬
ported. The primary commercial enter¬
prise in Sonora between 1881 and 1910
was slave trading. The primary import
was slave traders. Before that time the
economy was basically agricultural.
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sprang up to supply the firm. Yucatan was one region characterized by
monocrop feudal economy responding to the market requirements of the
foreign traders headquartered in Mexico City. Sonora was one of the
regions which responded to the need for slaves in Yucatan and elsewhere.
The economy of Sonora was as structurally dependent upon the feudal
economy of Yucatan as the Plantation system of Yucatan was dependent
on the capitalist economies of Mexico City and the United States.
Thus, the henequen trade demonstrates how intranational underdevelopment
was a function of contact with the American multinational oil companies.
The strongest competition for the Americans for domination of the
Mexican oil fields was Royal Dutch Shell. Owing to her strong position
and extensive reserves in the United States and in Mexico, Standard was
in no hurry to exploit Mexico*s oil at a rate faster than the local
market could absorb. She, therefore, pumped oil at a rate commensurate
with the requirements of her own situation. Diaz wanted more oil pumped
because the collapse of the traditional indigenous economy had destroyed
the traditional sources of government financing and increased his de¬
pendence on royalties. After 1905 dependence on royalties became criti¬
cal for Mexico for in that year the American Government decided to value
the peso against Mexico's gold reserves rather than silver. Since silver
was in greater supply this had the effect of devaluating the peso, and
rendered silver less useful as an export item. Oil became the most
valuable export Mexico had to offer. Further, since Mexico's economy
was dependent upon imports from the United States and other countries
McGraw Hill, 1954), pp. 101-102
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it was essential that she find a source of foreign exchange earnings
to replace silver. Diaz's solution was increased oil exports, but the
Americans could not increase output without driving her own prices
down at the retail and wholesale levels. They therefore refused. Shell,
on the other hand, had markets and was short of supplies with which to
service them.
Since the middle of the nineteenth century. Standard and other
American oil companies had been supplying the European market to a
limited extent. At about the same time that American companies began
to expand into Mexico, European companies such as British Petroleum and
Shell began to search the world for sources with which to compete with
the Americans in both Europe and the United States. British Petroleum
centered its search in the Middle East where Britain had colonies and
protectorates. This was a natural direction for British Petroleum to
expand into since the British Government owned a sizeable share of the
companies' stock. Shell, likewise, spread into the areas controlled
by the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). Indonesian oil was difficult to
exploit profitably due to the rough terrain in which it was located.
Shell then turned its attention to Central and South America. It was
this decision which brought the company into conflict with the American
oil companies in Mexico.
Shell's needs for crude oil supplies and Diaz's need for additional
revenue made it possible for Shell to temporarily displace Standard as
the leading producer in Mexico. In 1905 and again in I9O6, Shell pro¬
posed a plan by which Diaz would reclaim the unexplored and unexploited
regions held by the Americans and reopen them for leasing. Standard
had covered concession areas with widely spaced wells. Shell's plan
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called for reclaiming the space between the wells and leasing them to
Standard's competition, who would not only pay for the concessions but
would also increase output and thereby generate more revenue for the
Diaz regime. Diaz agreed, and by 1910, Shell could claim fifty-eight
percent of all production in Mexico.
When the Mexican Revolution began, the American oil companies were
eager to remove Diaz not just because he was under fire from their Creole
allies but primarily because he had allowed Shell and other European
companies to challenge American domination of the country's resources.
The Madero Movement was nothing more than a tool or a weapon used
against the competition. The American companies' position at the top
of the economic pyramid in Mexico precluded their viewing the workers
and peasants as anything more than forces to be crushed in the same
manner as Shell's challenge. The Mexican Revolution became the area in
which both these goals were pursued.
What began as the workers' effort against oppression in 1910,
ended in 1920 with the economic alignments unchanged. Nationalist hopes
in 1910 of throwing off foreign domination were totally frustrated ten
years later, as the Mexican economy remained dominated by foreign
interests. Liberal arguments for public ownership of the subsoil re¬
sources saw 1920 arrive with oil still very much controlled by private
interests. There was one significant change, however, during the Mexi¬
can Revolution. The American oil companies entered it as the second
largest producers and ended it as the first. How this change came
about while other social changes did not, represents a classic case of
political domination of an underdeveloped country by a developed country.
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Of all the issues over which the revolution was fought, the one
on which the most energy was spent was who should control the country's
oil resources. Very early in the dispute the American oil companies
gained the initiative by naming a President of Mexico loyal to their
interests. Although European interests were able to dislodge the
American puppet, the American firms regained the initiative by invoking
the national security argument and rallying the United States Government
to their cause. It was this involvement by the American Government
which proved to be decisive in causing certain changes to occur while
frustrating others.
By 1909 the workers* and peasants* movements had gained enough
momentum to make it clear to the oil companies that Diaz could not long
remain in power. It was equally clear, however, that should PLM gain
control of the Government all foreign and gentry privileges would be
threatened. Therefore, the American oil companies closed ranks with the
Madero faction. In the 1910 Presidential campaigns, the American oil
companies supported Madero's candidacy with secret contributions,^ How¬
ever, Diaz had Madero placed under repeated arrest and hampered his
ability to wage a serious challenge. Madero was brought to the United
States after the elections and was encouraged by the Americans to launch
a military effort against Diaz. The firms provided him with financing
2
and the United States Army supplied him with officers.
While Madero had been campaigning in 1910, the PLM had gained the
^E. H. Davenport, The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1924), p. 264,
2
Denny, We Fight for Oil, p. 46,
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initiative by launching a military offensive. Pancho Villa and Emilio
Zapata were also engaging Diaz’s troops. Therefore, when he came to
the United States, Madero was encouraged to regain the initiative by
announcing the formation of a Provisional Government with himself as
President. One of the American officers assigned to Madero testified
before a Senate Committee in 1913 on the nature of the arrangements
between Madero and the American firms. He said:
Mr. Madero himself told me that as soon as the rebels made
a good showing of strength leading bankers in El Paso stood
ready to advance him $100,000; and Governor Gonzales of
Chihuahua and Secretary of State Hernandez told me also that
the Standard Oil interests had bought bonds of the Provisional
Government of Mexico . . . they said that the Standard Oil
interests were backing them in their revolution .... Stan¬
dard Oil was to have a high rate of interest and there was a
tentative agreement as to an oil concession in the Southern
states of Mexico.^
Madero reentered Mexico on February 14, 1911 ostensibly to take
command of the insurgent forces. In fact he only commanded a small
contingent and the majority of the revolutionaries followed Villa,
Zapata, and the PLM. Madero initially used his forces as a weapon
against Standard Oil's competition. In so doing he demonstrated the con¬
trol which the Americans had over him and his faction of the opposition.
Madero's band attacked Mexican Eagle Petroleum and Shell properties.
One of Britain's best wells was set on fire and burned for forty days
2
and nights. Over one-hundred million barrels of crude was consumed.
This type of activity caused one British official to complain that "the
Americans even hired bands of brigands who destroyed Pearson's oil




pipes and set fire to his wells.^
The oil companies* plan was to have Madero prove his power as a
military leader in order to legitimize his claim on the Presidency. In
order to do this he would have to lead the victorious forces into Mexico
City and remove Diaz. His performance was dissappointing, however, and
he suffered defeats the first two times he engaged Diaz's troops. In
the second engagement he was wounded and retreated to a defensive posi¬
tion. Pancho Villa and Emilio Zapata, together with the PLM forces
were having much better success. Zapata captured Morelos in March.
Acapulco fell to the PLM. Villa's band took Durango and much of nor¬
thern Mexico. Within weeks after these cities fell Jalapa, Tehuacan,
Saltillo, Torreon, and Culiacan came under rebel control. Some units
were operating within the vicinity of Mexico City. Victory by the
workers and peasants seemed imminent.
This possibility caused the American oil firms considerable
anxiety. PLM had declared itself in favor of public ownership of the
subsoil, increased wages, land reforms, and a number of other measures
which if operationalized would completely undermine the oil companies'
position. They therefore organized a delegation of American business¬
men located in Mexico City and called on the United States Ambassador,
2
Henry Lane Wilson. Ambassador Wilson was convinced of the urgency of
the situation and so appealed directly to President Taft for help. The
President in turn responded by deploying troops along the United States-





State Pacific Fleet off the coast of Mexico. In issuing the order,
President Taft stated that;
It seems my duty as Commander-in-Chief to place troops in
sufficient number where, if Congress shall direct that they
enter Mexico to save American lives and property, an effect¬
ive movement may be made. My determined purpose . . . is to
be in a position so that when danger to American lives and
property in Mexico threatens, and the existing government is
rendered helpless by the insurrection, I can promptly execute
congressional orders to protect them.^
The clear purpose of the deployment, then, was to be in a posi¬
tion to invade Mexico should the revolutionaries succeed before Madero.
The deployment also served as a warning to Diaz to either resign in
favor of the American sponsored Madero or be forced out by the revolu¬
tionaries. In late April Diaz pressed for an Armistice and issued
orders to all efforts against Diaz to cease. On May 7» 1911 Diaz re¬
signed and transferred power directly to Madero. Madero allowed him to
leave the country and take his fortune with him. This no doubt played
an important part in Diaz's decision to transfer power to Madero in¬
stead of to the guerillas. Diaz had also ordered the death of several
hundred striking workers and had allowed the peasants to be enslaved.
Had he been taken by them there is a good chance that he would have
been tried and even executed. This consideration possibly played an
important role in Madero's decision not to confer with the revolu¬
tionaries during the transfer. Perhaps an even more important considera¬
tion for Madero was the fact that he was answerable to the American oil
companies who did not want the liberals represented in the Madero
Government.
^Thomas H. Russell, Mexico in War and Peace (Chicago;
and Britton Syndicate, 1914), p. 77»
Reilly
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Upon assuming the Presidency, Madero named nine new cabinet mem¬
bers. Seven were Creoles who had supported him in his election bids,
and two were former Diaz supporters. They all were of the gentry,
conservative, landlords, and supporters of the concept of private owner¬
ship of the subsoil. In response to this cabinet and to the general
method by which Madero came to power, the revolutionaries refused to
lay down their weapons. Workers struck throughout the next three years,
and the majority of the people refused to recognize Madero. Pancho
Villa was one of them. Madero responded to the strikes and the workers
and peasants in a fashion identical to Diaz. The army was used to
violently repress any attempt to change the status quo.
The cabinet Madero named and his reaction to the workers, were
both manifestations of his being controlled by the American business
interests and his commitment to the interests of the gentry. However,
the oil companies were his primary source of support and they could
best be repaid with oil concessions. Between 1911 and 1913» the Ameri¬
can oil companies moved from second to first as Mexico's largest oil
producers. Whereas, Shell claimed fifty-eight percent of the oil pro¬
duced in 1910, sixty-five percent of the 1913 production came to the
United States. American oil companies headed by Standard Oil of New
Jersey increased their production from 14 million barrels to 27 million
barrels over the same period. Additionally, Madero allowed the oil
industry to become an export industry rather than continuing to serve
the domestic market. Oil exports went from approximately twenty-five
percent of the total in 1909 to sixty-five percent in 1913. Stated
otherwise, the Mexican economy had become even more of an export
economy, even more dependent on foreign markets, and more controlled
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by foreign interests than it was during the nineteenth century. This
was the price extracted by the American companies for their "help."
The successful removal of Diaz did not close the chapter on
foreign corporate subversion of the revolution and the leadership selec¬
tion process. In fact, it opened it. Royal Dutch Shell lost its lever¬
age in Mexico when Diaz resigned. Their loss was reflected in the fact
that in the three years of the Madero regine, Shell’s share in Mexico’s
production declined from fifty-eight percent to twenty-seven percent.^
Throughout Madero’s term the European firms maneuvered for an opening.
One appeared in the person of General Victoriano Huerta of the Mexican
Army. On February 13, 1913, exactly two full years after he reentered
Mexico with his American sponsored army, Madero was captured in a Huerta
led coup and executed.
The dynamics of this competition between the British and American
firms had the effect of suppressing the social reform issues for which
most Mexicans were fighting. The issue vhich emerged as supreme after
1910 was control over the country's oil resources. United States Secre¬
tary of State, William Jennings Bryant indirectly noted this phenomena
when he told the British Ambassador to Washington that Britain "...
2
had handed its Mexican policy over to the oil barons." In reply the
British Ambassador said:
Mr. Secretary, you are talking just like a Standard Oil man
. . . You are pursuing a policy which they have decided on.’
^Joseph E. Pogue, The Economics of Petroleum (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1921), p. 320.
2
Quoted in Denny, We Fight for Dil. p, 4?.
^Ibid.
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The American political leadership did become actively involved
on the side of the American oil companies. According to his biographer,
President Wilson
... had many tempestuous conflicts with the British foreign
office over the support given to the Huerta regime by Sir
Lionel Carden, the British Minister to Mexico. A support
intensified to no small extent by the large British oil conv-
panies in Mexico whose influence in London's official circles
was appreciable.1
Former Secretary of State, Knox, argued before Congress for an invasion
of Mexico for the purpose of deposing Huerta and imposing a regime
loyal to American business interests. He phrased his appeal in humani¬
tarian terms but given the objectives of American businesses at the
time his intentions were clear. He said the invasion should be launched
to.
lend assistance to the restoration of order and the mainten¬
ance of peace in that unhappy country and the placing of the
administrative functions in the hands of capable and patri¬
otic citizens of Mexico.2
The Wilson administration was supportive of this argument. They
wanted to make an example of Mexico so that other underdeveloped coun¬
tries in Latin America and elsewhere would not attempt to align them¬
selves with America's competitors. The brutality of the Huerta regime
also served to keep the worker and peasant movement fueled. The in¬
stability caused by these movements together with Huerta's alignment
with the Europeans created a situation which neither the American busi¬
ness nor the American political leadership was willing to tolerate. Had
^David Lawrence, The True Story of Woodrow Wilson (New York;
Harper & Row, 1924), p. 100.
^Ibid.
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either the revolutionaries or the Europeans succeeded in Mexico, Ameri¬
can domination throughout Latin America would have been threatened.
President Wilson alluded to this possibility when he said;
The present situation in Mexico is incompatible with the ful¬
fillment of the international obligation on the part of Mexico,
with the civilized development of Mexico herself, and with the
maintenance of tolerable political and economic conditions in
Latin America.1
He went on to state the importance of American domination of Mexico to
the domination of all of Central America, particularly the Panama
Canal zone:
Mexico lies at last where all the world looks on. Central
America is about to be touched by the great routes of the
world's trade and intercourse running from ocean to ocean
at the Isthmus. The future has much in store for Mexico
... but the best gifts can come to her only if she be
ready to receive them.2
The obvious implication was that Mexican development was not possible
without American direction and domination. In truth, however, American
expansion into Central and South America would be seriously hampered if
Mexico was not firmly controlled.
Neither Huerta nor the revolutionaries were convinced by the Ameri¬
can argument. Nor was there now an organized conservative element among
the Creoles with which the Americans could align themselves. Huerta
had purged those elements sympathetic to the American position. In
desperation, the American business and political interests openly under¬
took a plan to destroy the Huerta Government.
The plan had three components; political, economic, and military.
^U.S. Department of State, Report on Foreign Relations of the
United States of America, (Washington 1913)» pp. 280-281.
^Ibid.
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Politically Huerta was to be isolated from all forms of domestic and
international support. Economically, the Mexican economy was destabil¬
ized to the point where Huerta would come under pressure to resign from
internal forces. Militarily, the United States supported the insurgent
forces which emerged. American troops were also used to invade Mexico in
an attempt to install a Government committed to American business inter¬
ests. The political campaign began with threats of intervention. The
intent was to prevent Huerta from taking any serious action against
American businesses such as nationalizations before the overall plan
was operationalized. Huerta was warned that "any maltreatment of
Americans is likely to raise the question of intervention."^ This
was followed with demands that Huerta resign. President Wilson stated
that it was his,
clear judgement that it is his immediate duty to require
Huerta's retirement from the Mexican Government and that
the government of the United States must now proceed to em¬
ploy such means as may be necessary to serve this result.^
If there was any doubt as to who would rule Mexico—Americans,
Europeans, or Mexicans—this statement removed it. Huerta understood
the seriousness of the American claim to political hegemony in Mexico,
and that the United States would not hesitate to invade the country to
achieve its ends. He also understood the demonstration effect his regime
was having on other Latin American countries, and it was to them that he
took his case. Huerta launched a diplomatic offensive in which he
^Ibid.
2
Quoted in Denny, We Fight for Oi1. p. 49.
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reminded his Latin American neighbors of their common domination by
the United States. He said: "Mexico is defending not only her national
sovereignty but that of all Latin America." This tactic had some immedi¬
ate results as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile offered to remove the stigma
of an American President dictating to a Latin American President by
negotiating a settlement between Huerta and Wilson. Wilson found it
impossible to ignore this offer and agreed. However, he demanded that
the mediators meet in the United States so that the impression would not
be created that an American President was "coming to" them.
Demanding that the mediators meet in the United States served
another purpose, however. The Americans could delay the meeting on the
pretense of making "arrangements"^ until the economic and military com¬
ponents of their plan could be successful. While the three mediators
were waiting for the negotiations to get underway, the American plan
to destablize the Mexican economy was operationalized. President Wilson
issued orders on how the effort was to proceed:
Cut him off from sympathy and aid from domestic credit, whether
moral or material, and force him out .... If General Huerta
does not retire by force of circumstances, it will become the
duty of the United States to use less peaceful means to put him
out, 2
It should be kept in mind that the largest investors and, there¬
fore, lenders in Mexico were American controlled banks. Therefore, the
order to cut Huerta off was effectively carried out with a minimum of
effort. Further, since Americans—particularly Standard Oil—controlled
^Ibid., p. 51.
^Ibid., pp. 49-50.
the Creole gentry in the indigenous economy, all significant commercial
activity in the country was brought to a halt.
Huerta appealed to his sponsors at Shell Oil for help. They
arranged for him to get a sixty million peso loan from European sources.^
However, when the Americans found out they brought extreme pressure to
bear on the countries concerned. Britain was warned that the Panama
Canal might be closed to her ships if she persisted in supporting Huerta.
Britain then capitulated and offered to help negotiate a compromise. The
United States State Department rejected the British mediation offer with
the terse observation that:
There is a more hopeful prospect of peace, of the security of
property and the early payment of foreign obligations if Mexico
is left to the forces now reckoning with one another there.3
The effect of the pressure is evidenced by the fact that only ten million
of the sixty million peso loan was delivered. Of that amount, seven
million was owed to Standard Oil owned enterprises. In fact, the reason
Huerta had requested the loan was to honor some maturing long term bonds
which American businessmen held. However, the Americans wanted him in
a position where he would both owe them and not be able to pay. This
would make American control even greater. The fact that the funds which
had been used to purchase the bonds came from profits earned in Mexico
further evidences the disadvantages of private foreign control over re¬
sources. By keeping Huerta indebted the Americans could enforce their
^Michael C. Meyer, Huerta: A Political Portrait (Lincoln: Univer¬
sity of Nebraska Press, 1972), pp. 148-185 passim.
2
Denny, We Fight for Oi 1, p. 51-
3
U.S. Department of State, Report on Foreign Relations of the
United States of America. (Washington 1913)» p* 444.
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domination of Mexico without incurring any financial risk.
Huerta's unwillingness and inability to reform the government and
economy assured him the continuing opposition of the workers and peasants.
The American oil companies and their home government had no doubt predicted
this, and succeeded once again in directing the Mexican Revolution in a
direction which served their interests. Huerta, however, refused to
follow the example of Diaz and resign. The Americans increased the
pressure on him by providing arms to the revolutionaries. This decision
was expressed to the British foreign office by the United States State
Department when it informed the British that President Wilson ". . . in¬
tends to remove the inhibition on the exportation of arms and ammunition
from the United States"^ to Mexico.
The most conservative element of the insurgent forces was that led
by General Carranza, and just as with Madero, this was the element which
received American assistance. The role of American oil companies in
financing the insurgents was described by Edward L. Doheny before the
United States Senate. He said, "every American corporation doing busi¬
ness in Mexico extended aid or sympathy or both—and we extended both—
to General Carranza." Doheny also admitted that he had given Carranza
$100,000 in cash and another $685,000 in credits. Doheny was careful,
however, to give the impression that he was acting in the interest of
national security and not profits:
Our Government had shown its animosity to Huerta and its desire
to support his opponents. So that our action was in line with
^Ibid.
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our Government and that of the British (oil companies) was in
line with the sympathies of the British Government.^
The illusion which Doheny attempted to create was that the dispute cen¬
tered on political differences between the Governments of the United
States, Britain, and Mexico, and that as good corporate citizens the
oil companies simply acted in the interests of their home governments.
The truth of the matter was that the British and American Governments
were acting in the interests of the oil companies. Carranza and Huerta
were simply pawns to be used and then sacrificed.
Carranza, however, aligned himself with the Germans and posed the
prospect America would sponsor a regime which, upon coming to power,
would act against the interests of American businesses. Therefore, the
United States took advantage of the refusal of Mexican officials at
2
Tampico to salute the American Flag and invaded Mexico. Huerta was
forced from office but Carranza's forces were too strong for him to be
denied the Presidency.
Carranza came to power just as World War I was getting under way.
In support of the central powers, he made it expensive for the Americans
to use Mexican oil in the effort against the Germans. Within one year
after assuming the Presidency, Carranza increased the taxes-on oil imports
from a flat rate of 3»9 cents per barrel to a scaled rate. Since light
crude was the easiest to refine, and could be refined into a greater
variety of products than heavy crude, this increase in taxes and export
duties had the effect of increasing the costs in an area which had the
most attraction for the American companies. Additionally, the increased
^Hearings before the Senate Committee on Oil Explorations, 66th
Congress, 2nd session, vol. 9> 191^*
2This invasion is popularly known as the "Tampico Bay Incident."
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taxes on refined fuel oil and gasoline substantially reduced the pro¬
fitability of the companies' operations in Mexico.
TABLE 1
1915 MEXICAN PETROLEUM TAX
Petroleum Production Tax Export Tax
Heavy Crude $0.05/barrel $0.0075
Light Crude $0.ll/barrel 0.0075
Fuel Oil $0.09/barrel 0.0075
Gasoline $0.56/barrel 0.0075
SOURCE: John G. McLean and Robert W. Haiqht, The Growth of the
Inteqrated Oil Companies (Norwood, Mass.: The Plimpton Press, 1954),
p. 86.
Carranza followed this increase with a political campaign designed
to reclaim public ownership of the subsoil. This effort resulted in
the adoption of the 1917 Constitution^ in which the principle of public
ownership was restored. Carranza also pushed for a provision which
gave the national government authority to nationalize any industry if
such action was in the national interest. The popularity of these two
provisions together with the provision for a one term Presidency made
Carranza a national hero, and effectively prevented the oil companies
from raising sufficient opposition to oust him. It occurred when an
officer in the Mexican Garrison at Tampico failed to salute the American
Flag flying from a supply boat. The invasion was carried out even though
Huerta had submitted an apology through diplomatic channels.
Whe 1917 Constitution is still in force in Mexico.
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However, the one term Presidency rule did provide opportunities
which could be exploited. Carranza was due to leave office in 1920 so
the American companies threw their support to the candidacy of Alvaro
Obregon, a wealthy attorney committed to the principle of private owner¬
ship. The election of Obregon in 1920 is generally regarded as the end
of the Mexican Revolution.^ The Mexicans had reclaimed legal ownership
over the subsoil, but the Americans still controlled oil production and
were in no fear of having their properties nationalized.
When the revolution began there already existed a structural rela¬
tionship between the American oil companies and the economy of Mexico
which made the latter totally responsive to the needs of the former.
Further, at the outset of the revolution the Americans were not the
dominant foreign influence on the country's political leadership, yet at
the end they were. The only economic changes which the revolution had
brought was the severe disruption of the slave trade and increases in
taxes on foreign investments which had long since paid a high profit.
The destruction of the slave system destroyed much of the solvency of
the Creole gentry and their plantations but did not affect the primary
interests of the oil companies. Therefore, when the revolution ended,
the gentry had suffered more than the companies with whom they aligned
themselves.
Over the next few years the companies used their strength to manipu¬
late the country's resources to an extent which has never been surpassed.
^Some writers such as Peter Calvert, Supra, regard 191^ as the last
year of the Mexican Revolution because that is the year Huerta consoli¬
dated his power. Others such as Denny, Supra, give 1920 as the last
year because in that year an elected civilian government came to power.
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Oil production was increased and decreased to suit the companies. At
the end of World War I the United States found that she had seriously
depleted many of her best oil fields. The American companies used their
influence with Obregon to increase production in Mexico to offset the
deficit in American production.
TABLE 2











1918 450 365 63.8 40.800
1919 500 378 92.4 57.600
1920 550 443 163.0 112.000
Note: All quantities are given in millions of barrels
SOURCE: Joseph E. Pogue, The Economics of Petroleum (New York:
John Wiley & Company, Incorporated, 1921), p. 320.
As the above table clearly shows that United States imports from
American oil companies in Mexico increased by almost one hundred per¬
cent in the year that Obregon came to the Mexican Presidency. In that
same year supply in the United States was 107 million barrels below
demand and was more than offset by imports from Mexico. In the previous
year the United States experienced a production deficit of 122 million
barrels but Carranza only permitted 57.6 million to be exported. In
1918 the deficit was 85 million barrels and imports from Mexico w^re only
40.8 million. There is a clear correlation, then, between American poli¬
tical dominance and the extent to which she could exploit Mexico's re¬
sources to her own advantage.
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The increase in exports to the United States did, of course, carry
with it the benefit of increased royalty and tax earnings for Mexico.
However, when this benefit is weighed against what the Mexicans were
losing, a different picture emerges. When Carranza was pushing through
his nationalistic constitution, American oilmen were searching for al¬
ternatives to Mexican crude. The search was centered in Venezuela, where
the British had already had great success, and in the United States. By
1921 this search had been extremely successful as large oil fields were
discovered in Louisiana, Texas, California, and Oklahoma. The reaction
of the Americans was to abandon Mexico and allow her best wells to drown
in salt water. By the end of 1921 only two of Mexico's oil pools were
still productive,^ One was practically undeveloped and the other was
partly exhausted. All the others had been abandoned to salt water in¬
cursion, even though it was a simple procedure to tap them and therefore
save them for Mexico to benefit from. The withdrawal of the American
oil companies was made even more sinister by the fact that in the same
year in which they were allowing most of the country's wells to drown,
they were producing at maximum capacity from the two fields that were
kept operational. In 1921 American companies took a record 193 million
2
barrels of crude from Mexico, but began a steep cut back the very next
year.
Just as the American companies maneuvered for control of Mexico's
political leadership in order to maximize their economic advantage, so












Note: Quantities given in barrels
SOURCE: Figures on Mexican production are from Leonard M, Fanning,
Foreign Oil and the Free World (New York: McGraw Hill, 1954), pp. 28-29.
Figures on Gulf production are from John G, McLean and Robert W, Haight,
The Growth of the Integrated Oil Companies (Norwood, Mass.: The Plimpton
Press, 1954), p. 96.
they abandoned the country in a move to maximize profits. Their politi¬
cal position was fairly secure as long as Obregon was President. Obregon
was replaced by President Calles who, although nationalistic, was com¬
mitted to the principle of private ownership of the oil industry. How¬
ever, during the rule of both presidents there developed an oversupply
of oil owing to the newly discovered fields in the United States and
Venezuela. This had the effect of pushing retail prices down and there¬
fore necessitated a production cutback.
The cutback in production had a positive effect on prices since it
created an artificial shortage. By 1935 retail gasoline prices were back
up to $0.25/gallon,^ and continued to climb in the ensuing years. The










SOURCE: John G. McLean and Robert W. Haight, The Growth of the
Integrated Oil Companies (Norwood, Mass.: The Plimpton Press, 1954),
p. 86.
to climb again American oil fields were revalued upwards whereas those
In Mexico had been taken out of competition. The deliberateness with
which Mexico was exploited for the convenience of American oil fields
can best be demonstrated by focusing on a single company.
TABLE 5









1915 871,000 12,215,000 1,275,000
1920 11,021,000 19,507,000 8,186,000
1925 5,400,000 31,302,000 11,436,000
1930 1,944,000 42,747,000 24,197,000
1935 1,594,000 37,382,000 21,748,000




The success with which the American oil companies maneuvered to
control the political leadership was owed directly to the support they
received from the American Government. In fact that support was so
forceful that the companies were able to claim that they were acting in
the interest of the Government. The effect of that support was to sup¬
press the liberal intent of the Mexican Revolution and leave the economic
structure by which the masses of the Mexican people had been exploited
intact. After the revolution the American companies used the strength
which American governmental intervention had saved for them and proceeded
to rape Mexico's oil fields. The oversupply situation which this rape
helped to bring on was also used against the Mexicans since the value of
oil reserves in the United States was increased at the exprense of Mexico.
This total domination and exploitation caused severe problems for under¬
developed Mexico. The United States had told her during the revolution
that association with America was the best way to development. Yet after
the revolution, Mexico was exploited at a record rate. In reaction to
this exploitation and domination, Mexican leaders in 1934 nationalized
the oil, rail and mining industries. At the time, supporters of the
American oil companies predicted that the Mexican oil industry would col-
1 2
lapse without American help. However, by 1967* the Wall Street Journal
^Representative of the kind of support given the American oil com¬
panies and the hostility towards the Mexican nationalists is Merwin K.
Hart, "This American System: Is It To Be Destroyed?" in Vital Speeches
of the Day 4 (February 1, 1938): 238.
2
"Model Monopoly—Nationalized Oil Agency So Successful It Worries
The Industry," Wall Street Journal. 26 January 1967» p. 1.
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was offering unqualified praise for the Mexican National Petroleum
Company (PEMEX) and predicting that other countries would be tempted
to follow Mexico's example and end American domination of their oil
industries. One of the countries to follow the example of Mexico is
Venezuela, the country which succeeded Mexico as the chief foreign
supplier of crude oil and petroleum products to the United States.
CHAPTER III
VENEZUELA: OIL POLITICS IN A PRODUCER-EXPORTER NATION
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the impact of American
multinational oil firms of Venezuelan political and economic development.
In so doing the history of their involvement will be studied from the
initial penetration of the country in 1908 to approximately I960. This
chapter will identify the techniques employed by the multinations to gain
hegemony over Venezuela's oil and the style of their political behavior.
The activities of the American government in support of the oil firms
will also be clarified.
As in Mexico, the control exercised by the multinational oil firms
over the economic life of Venezuela had a definite impact on the politi¬
cal development of the country. Also, as in Mexico, the oil firms oc¬
casionally lost complete control of the political apparatus of the
country and lost economic ground as a result. This chapter will analyze
the nationalist forces which opposed the oil firms and their association
with the aspirations of the Venezuelan masses. This is an essential
step towards understanding the role of the oil firms on the country*s
development because a different type of political and economic style is
represented by the nationalists. The oil firms favored authoritarian,
repressive regimes which encouraged foreign control of key economic
sectors. The nationalists favored democratic forms of government which
concentrated on stimulating the domestic economy. The differences in
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the impact of these two approaches on the lives of the majority of
Venezuelans raises several questions about the viability of foreign
investment as a stimulus to modernization.
Following World War I oil companies in the United States and Europe
began a frantic search for foreign crude sources to replace the inven¬
tories consumed by the war effort. This search was centered in the
Middle East^ and Latin America. The Middle East was a British controlled
area owing to her colonization of the area. However, Venezuela was with¬
in the United States' sphere of influence as far as American business
and political leaders were concerned, and American oil companies centered
their efforts there. Royal Dutch Shell had also located a new oil field
in Venezuela and this also influenced the American decision to penetrate
the country. The experience of the companies in Mexico had shown them
that dictators make good trading partners, and one of the first observa¬
tions made of the Venezuelan political situation was that expressed by
the New York Times when it editoralized that:
The best thing that could happen would be the rise to power
of a Venezuelan Diaz, strong enough to maintain civil order
and wise enough to give the Venezuelans the sincere desire
to keep him in office.2
While this did not accurately reflect the attitude of the great majority
Two of the best accounts of oil politics and American oil companies
in the Middle East are Benjamin Schwardran, The Middle East. Oil and the
Great Powers (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973) and Christopher Rand,
Making Democracy Safe for Oil (Boston: Little, Brown & Co,, 1975).
2
"Castro, Last Latin American Dictator," New York Times. 25 Febru¬
ary 1906. Also see "Castro Must Act on American Claims," New York Times.
30 June 1906 and "Revolution in Venezuela," New York Times 11 December
1906.
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of the Mexican people it did reflect the pattern of political development
of the former colonial territories favored by many American businessmen.
It was also reflective of the degree to which the American media sup¬
ported the expansionist policies of the American oil companies. The fact
that the New York Times could make such a statement without receiving
any significant protest from its readers was indicative of the degree of
apathy in the United States towards the oppressive practices of the
government and oil companies.
Cipriano Castro was dictator of Venezuela at the time the above
statement was made. It was he who granted Shell the concessions with
which she first found oil in Venezuela. It was partly in reaction to
Castro's alignment with Shell that the New York Times criticized the
political situation in Venezuela. And it was in reaction to the same
situation that the American government and oil companies maneuvered to
remove Castro. In 1908 Castro left one of his generals, Gomez, in com¬
mand while he went to Europe for medical care. While he was away the
Americans made a deal with Gomez whereby America defended his bid for
permanent control in return for oil concessions. When Castro attempted
to return to Venezuela the United States Navy captured his ship and
forced him to return to Europe. United States Secretary of State Knox
then visited Venezuela to demonstrate American support for Gomez,
Over the next several years American and European oil companies
engaged in vicious competition for control over Venezuela's oil. Harvey
O'Connor studied this competition and reported that:
After the war, Jersey's ^tandard Oil of New Jerse)'/ agents
began prowling about again. They decided to bypass the old
custom of lavish entertainment and bribing of intermediaries
and to approach the dictator directly. During the war Gomez
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had been pro-German, but by 1919 he was anxious to favor America
as a counter-point to the British. He was friendly and Standard
bid on five concessions. By odd chance, on the same day Gomez’s
son-in-law also bid on the same concessions, got them and sold
them to Sun Oil. . . Standard turned to the son-in-law and
bought 1 eases.1
Gomez’s practice was to nationalize land on which oil was found, and
offer them for public bid. He claimed to favor Venezuelan bidders over
foreigners. However, this was his way of enriching himself, his family
and a few friends at the expense of the masses of the people. Peasants
obviously could not afford to bid on oil concessions. It was equally
obvious that Venezuelans who could bid would be of the gentry. Further,
Venezuelans lacked the technological sophistication to exploit the oil
resources. Therefore, favoring them created the practice by which the
Venezuelan gentry could earn a profit on the oil by purchasing the con¬
cessions at one price and selling them to the foreign companies at a
higher price. The American and other foreign companies supported this
practice because they were assured of gaining control of the country’s oil
regardless.
The maneuverings around the country’s oil determined the political
climate of Venezuela, and her relationship to the outside world. The
immediate and longterm beneficiaries of these manipulations were the
foreign oil companies, headed by Standard Oil of New Jersey, who came to
dominate production. Foreign governments were also active participants
in the competition. During the period in which competition for Vene¬
zuelan’s oil was fiercest, it was impossible to separate diplomacy from
^Harvey O’Connor, World Crisis in Oil (New Yorks Monthly Review
Press, 1962), p. 131.
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the politics of oil.
The American legation (in Venezuela) was so busy on oil matters
that Shell employed Americans, easily disguised as agents of
American companies, to prowl the legation's offices in search
of information, Washington, on the other hand, learned that an
Anglo-Persian subsidiary controlled an important British con¬
cession-seeker contrary to Venezuelan law against nationally-
owned entities receiving concessions, and passed this informa¬
tion on to Gomez, Another company, British Controlled Oilfields,
which was darkly suspected of gaining concessions in Columbia,
PancHTia, and Costa Rica in order to menace the Panama Canal, was
also informed on. , , ,1
As the above quote clearly demonstrates, diplomatic courtesies
had little to do with the competition. The companies used every con¬
ceivable tactic against one another and the Venezuelans. Shell had
avoided Venezuelan taxes by keeping two sets of books. American firms
discovered this by compromising a Shell employee and then passed the
information on to President Gomez. Gomez was also paid a bribe of
2
$1*350,000 to punish Shell by reclaiming part of her concession area.
He agreed and for an additional $1,350,000 the property was transferred
to the American companies.
Throughout this initial period of competitive penetration and
trickery there were repeated attempts by nationalists within the coun¬
try's legislature to enact laws which would regulate the oil industry.
In 1918 the first petroleum law was passed, however, all it did was to
regulate the size of each concession. Prior to that time the companies
determined the size of concessions and were able to accumulate large
blocks of land by simply claiming that the oil pools they discovered




result in the large scale transfer of land from Venezuelan to foreign
hands, it also denied the Venezuelan treasury needed revenues since fees
were assessed on a per concession basis. Restricting the size of each
concession meant additional fees could be collected but it had little
effect on the companies’ ability to amass holdings since the law con¬
tained no limitations on the number of concessions a company could acquire.
Further, Gomez retained exclusive right to administer the law and in
this way the interests of the companies were protected from the national¬
ists.
In 1920 a new petroleum law was being pushed through the Congress.
It was designed to insure the government greater control over the oil
industry, and was sponsored by Gomez’s oil minister. The companies flatly
refused to abide by the law and threatened to abandon the country if it
were passed. Gomez dismissed the minister and asked the companies to
draft a law acceptable to them.
The resulting statute of 1922 was a compromise between their
draft and the laws ruling in Mexico at the time. . • . The new
law was praised by the companies as a model for the world, pro¬
viding as it did low rentals, low royalties, no regulation on
competitive off set drilling, the rights to expropriate lands,
... exemptions from custom duties on equipment and materials
imported, and a guarantee of no additional taxes ever.^
The new oil law still did not satisfy the companies’ desire for
total control. Nor did the law stimulate development within Venezuela.
One student of the Venezuelan oil industry after 1922 has reported that:
The Maracaibo Oil Exploration Company, an American company
bought concessions from Gomez’s retinue and peddled them in
turn to bona fide oil companies. In this way, the Venezuelan
treasury was cheated of what should have been a lucrative




British Controlled Oilfields got its concessions extended,
despite violations of the law, after it sold a third share
to Standard of New Jersey; the company dealt directly with
Gomez and got its sins forgiven, taxes remitted, and the con¬
cession prolonged. . .
Clearly the only effect of the 1922 petroleum law was to minimize the
degree to which the Venezuelans could regulate the activities of the
companies. The presence of Gomez in the Presidency effectively neu¬
tralized even that.
Gomez obviously felt a certain closeness for American companies.
He allowed them to organize a series of holding companies which would
purchase concessions under different names and resell them to the highest
bidder. The effect of these "paper" companies was to flood the market
with buyers between whom bidding could be controlled. In this manner
the value of the oil concessions to Venezuela was kept to a minimum
whereas their value to the Americans was kept high.
Fraud and deception, chicanery and double-dealing, were the
rules of the game. Three big American companies (Standard of
New Jersey, Standard of Indiana and Gulf) obtained their, lucra¬
tive leases in the corrupt-concession era of the Gomez regime.
Shell rested on its plentiful grants received earlier.^
The effects of the control of the country’s leadership and re¬
sources by the American companies were devastating. The Venezuelan
economy became structurally dependent on American capital and imports.
Food production went from a surplus prior to 1908 to a deficit in 1930.
Imports from the United States were substituted with the same results as
in Mexico. Non-oil exports declined over the same period by 40 percent




In contrast, imports of foodstuffs and luxury items increased by 60 per-
^ 1cent.
Plainly, when the political dictator died in 1935» an economic
dictator had already inherited Venezuela. Gomez's protege, the
petroleum industry, was the new ruler. The new tyranny was
immortal, and political upheavals disturbed it little. It
answered only to the markets in the United States and Western
Europe, and waited for the signals to be called from abroad.
Should the industry's decisions prove harmful to the sensitive
Venezuelan economy, that was fate. There was no remedy,2
Throughout the years after Gomez’s death, American oil firms con¬
tinued to consolidate their gains at the expense of the Venezuelan treas¬
ury. Standard Oil secured permission to deduct four cents per barrel
from its taxes as a sales commission to itself for refining Venezuelan
crude in Aruba. Gulf began depreciating its Venezuelan equipment by 15
percent per year to avoid the legitimate taxes. In 1938, when the taxes
and royalties on oil production were increased, the companies refused to
bid on new concessions in order to force repeal of the laws. Further,
throughout the depression years the United States imposed an import
quota on Venezuelan crude in a move which further limited the country's
earnings.^
Officials close to the American government, also, continued their
assistance to the American firms. In 19^6 when the principle by which
Venezuela would receive fifty percent of the profits made on her pro¬
duction was being discussed, Herbert Hoover, Jr., son of the former
Edwin Lieuwin, Petroleum In Venezuela; A History (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1955)> p» 147. Also see O'Connor,
World Crisis in Oil, p, 139«
2
O'Connor, World Crisis in Oil, p. 139.
^Ibid., p, 169.
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President of the United States, went to Venezuela to represent the oil
companies. Almost all of the concessions granted under General Gomez
was "tainted." Hoover convinced the Venezuelan Government that the
firms would abandon Venezuela if they were forced to remit fifty per¬
cent of their profits without receiving additional incentives. It was
under this pressure that the companies secured new, forty year exten¬
sions on all their concessions, and the Venezuelan Government was
forced to acknowledge the validity of illegally acquired holdings. The
companies were not really conceding anything by agreeing to split their
profits equally with the Venezuelan Government. In fact, they had
succeeded with the help of the American Government in retaining one-half
the profits in illegally acquired properties. They had also succeeded
in getting the Venezuelans to acknowledge the legitimacy, and extend
the life, of their claims.
In the first three decades of foreign ownership of the oil indus¬
try the living conditions of the peasant majority never improved. In
1944 Venezuela had a national budget equal to Mexico but only had one-
fifth as many citizens. The opportunity was, therefore, created for
Venezuela to develop at a faster rate. Despite this fact, the Venezuelan
people were worse off than their Mexican brothers. In Mexico, the petro¬
leum industry had been completely under the control of the National Gov¬
ernment since 1938, and the country was moving away from the export
market and into the domestic market. In this manner, Mexico stimulated
internal development by lowering oil prices so that marginal businesses
could grow; the oil industry was deliberately over-staffed to relieve
unemployment; oil revenues were used to build roads, schools, hospitals,
and other public service items so that taxes could be kept to a minimum.
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By contrast, the situation in Venezuela where the oil industry was still
exporting its profits to the United States and Europe; the conditions
of the majority of the people was worsening. Even the New York Times
July 15» 1945 was moved to note the relationship between mass suffering
and private ownership of oil in Venezuela:
The mass of the people in Venezuela today are poor, unhealthy,
illiterate, and live in the most primitive surroundings. The
economy is backwards. . . . Meanwhile the nation becomes more
and more dependent on a single extractive industry, more and
more sensitive to events abroad. There is much agreement that
the ^il7 industry is too powerful that the state can do little
to stop its absorbing force. . . .1
For the peasantry this meant that as the oil firms acquired more
and more land, they were pushed further and further into the mountain¬
ous areas. This deteriorating condition has been described as the
"Conqueror System" of exploitation.
The peasant leaves the valley ^here oil is found/i goes up
the mountainside where no one will bother him, and having
burned off a piece of forest land, plants his corn and beans
and bananas in rows running down hill. The first year his
crop is acceptable, but by the second, much of the topsoil
has run off and his crop is considerably smaller. The third
year, he barely gets enough to keep body and soul together.
The fourth year, he moves to a new part of the mountains to
start the whole process all over again.2
Ultimately there was no new land to move to and the peasants
flocked into the cities. Between 1940 and the end of the fifties, the
population of the cities tripled. .The population of Caracas increased
from roughly 400,000 in 1940 to 1.7 million in 1964. The total popula¬
tion of the country in 1964 was seven million. Therefore, one city
^Lieuwen, Petroleum in Venezuela, pp, 147-148.
2
Robert J. Alexander, The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution (New
Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p. 12.
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contained 2k percent of the national population. These facts testify to
the rapid urbanization which foreign oil companies stimulated after some
twenty million acres came under their control,^
Conditions in the cities were deplorable. There was inadequate
housing and sewage. Further, there were few jobs for peasants with
only farm skills. As a result the cities became centers of discontent.
World War II helped redirect mass hostilities away from the Medina
dictatorship and towards the axis powers. However, after the war the
unrest resulted in the ouster of Medina and the seating of the first
civilian government in the country's history.
The oil companies did much—indirectly—to bring this development
about. It was in reaction to the dictatorship's policies towards the
oil firms that the coup was launched. The companies had been allowed
2
to gain control of over 35 percent of the national land. They had
also driven large numbers of people out of work through the break up of
the subsistence farming economy. Although the companies expanded rapidly,
they did little to absorb the displaced workers and peasants. By re¬
maining insensitive to the needs of the majority of the people, the
companies fueled the forces which eventually overthrew their political
supporters. The following tables illustrate the capital intensity of
the oil industry and imbalance between production and employment growth.
Between 1926 and 1955 oil production increased by 21.87 percent.
Over roughly that same period the number of oil workers increased by
^"Venezuela," World Petroleum Report. 15 January 1957.
2
"Junior Officers Oust Medina," New York Times. 20 July 19^5.
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only 15.9 percent. Production grew approximately 140 times faster than
the number of oil workers. This fact testifies to both the capital
intensity of the oil industry and to the uneven contribution that foreign











SOURCE: Rudolfo Luzaro, Venezuela: Business and Finance
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957)» p. 4.
TABLE 7








SOURCE: Rudolfo Luzara, Venezuela: Business and Finance, p. 69.
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The development of the oil industry did not stimulate diversifica¬
tion of the economy. In 1913» agricultural products accounted for 90
percent of Venezuela’s exports. But 1936 petroleum exports accounted for
66 percent of all exports and this figure increased to 93 percent by
1955»^ The following table demonstrates the extent of oil’s dominance
of the Venezuelan economy, and its impact on industrialization. It indi¬
cates that whereas oil did not lead to the development of other export
industries, it did contribute to building up an infrastructure which
served the needs of the oil industry.
TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF VENEZUELA’S GROSS DOMESTIC














SOURCE: Fred J. Levy, Economic Planning in Venezuela (New York:
Praeger, 1962), p. 12.
Vred J. Levy, Economic Planning in Venezuela (New York: Praeger,
1962)
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Oil’s dominance becomes even more evident when it is realized that
90 percent of the manufacturing sector and 80 percent of the commerce
sector was directly dependent upon the oil industry. Further, the govern¬
ment was dependent upon oil and its related activities for more than 85
percent of its revenues.^ This pattern of development compares favorably
with that of Mexico prior to the nationalizations of 1938«
The longer the foreign companies operated in Venezuela the more
impoverished the masses of the people became. The following table shows
the disproportionate increase in food costs for the workers and peasants.
TABLE 9






Food 47.1 51.8 37.5 34.9
Fuel and Light 3.2 3.9 2.7 1.8
Clothing and
Toilet Articles 9.4 7.3 12.3 11.3
House Rent 18.6 18.2 17.2 18.4
SOURCE: Rudolfo Luzara, Venezuela; Business and Finance (Engle¬
wood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957)» pp. 87 & 149.
The above table clearly shows that the gentry's condition improved
to the point where less of their earnings had to be spent on the basic
necessities and luxury items. Conversely, the workers were forced to
spend more for the basics. The increase in food costs occurred because
^Ibid.
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farm lands were being transferred to the oil companies and imports from
the United States were substituted for locally grown products. One
result was rapid inflation in which the price of a single apple reached
forty-five cents and chicken reached $1.80 per pound.^ This inflation
was not associated with scarcity since the Rockefeller supermarket chain
was always well stocked. What it did represent was a new innovation on
the company store practices which had been practiced in Mexico.
Between 1945 and 1948 Venezuela experienced three years of demo¬
cratic rule followed by nine years of dictatorship. The three years of
civilian government saw the imposition of the principle in which the
companies had to pay fifty percent of their profits to the government,
a cessation of leases on new oil concessions, and calls for establishing
a national oil company to compete with the foreigners. These national¬
istic demands threatened the companies* hegemony in much the same way as
the Mexican nationalists had done under Cardenas. The companies respond¬
ed by seeking to destabilize the Venezuelan economy and by supporting
the oppressive dictatorship which forced the civilians from office before
they could carry through their plans.
As in Mexico, the nationalist movement of Venezuela comprised a
number of different factions, most of which grew out of the Anti-Gomez
movement (whereas in Mexico they grew out of the Anti-Diaz movement).
The original Anti-Gomez effort was spearheaded by Organizacion Revolu-
cionaria Venezolan (ORVE). It was made up of nationalists, socialists,
and communists. ORVE eventually split into a nationalistic wing with
^Rudolfo Luzara, Venezuela; Business and Finance (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957)» pp« 86 & 89*
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socialist orientations, and a communist wing. The former became Parti do
Democratica Nacional (PDN) led by Romulo Betancourt, The latter became
Partido Communista de Venezuella (PCU) led by Gustavo Machado, Other
formations of Social Catholics and Students also came into existence.
Jovita Vi 11 aba headed the Venezuelan Students Federation. After Medina
came to power and legalized these movements, PDN was renamed Accion
Democratica (AD), and PCU became Union Poplar. The students’ movement
was not legalized as a political party but its leader was named by
Medina to the Senate.
One of the most significant political developments took place
within the ranks of the military. The army was roughly split into three
groups. The senior officers were all older men with close ties to at
least one of the dictatorships. These men used their positions to main¬
tain the status quo and all of Venezuela’s leaders had come from among
them. The lower level of officers made up a second group. Many of these
men had received their education in the United States or Europe. Their
political orientation tended towards the democratic and the nationalistic.
They felt that government should be in the hands of civilians. The third
group in the military was occupied by persons who would have been peas¬
ants or workers had they not joined the army. They had no inherent
reason for wanting social, economic, and political conditions to reamin
as they were. Like the junior officers, the ordinary soldier aspired
for greater democracy and modernization. It was this coalition of junior
officers and soldiers who eventually took the lead in ousting Medina and
establishing a democratic, civilian led government.
The continued denial of the peoples’ right to select their poli¬
tical leadership precipitated the takeover of the government. Elections
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were scheduled for November 1945. Medina had planned to maintain the
tradition established by previous military leaders and hand pick the
government which succeeded him. This had been the process by which both
the military’s rule and the interests of foreign oil firms had been pro¬
tected. On July 15» 1945* Medina’s cabinet resigned and cleared the way
for him to form a new government which would elect the new president.
On October 20, 1945, the junior officers and soldiers arrested Medina
and Contreras before the succession could take place.
This move removed the vehicle of oil company influence over Vene¬
zuela’s political affairs. For several days after the coup, there was
considerable anxiety expressed from Washington and from U.S. oilmen in
Venezuela over the possible direction that the revolution might take in
reference to the oil industry. They were already aware that the forces
behind the coup were highly nationalistic and had waged a continuous
campaign to increase public participation in oil operations. Further,
the composition of the new government reflected the nationalists' intent
to establish a democratic government. Accion Democratica was the largest
organized political movement and held four seats on the seven-man Revo¬
lutionary Council. Romula Betancourt was named President of the Council.
Two military men, a major and a captain, also had seats. The last seat
was held by an independent.
The fact that the Communists had been left out of the new govern¬
ment together with the country's total dependence on the foreigners to
operate the oil industry meant that no radical programs were introduced.
The Revolutionary Council adopted a policy of gradually expanding national
dominance of the oil industry. Betancourt stated on October 25» 1945 that
The Junta will protect national interest, but we are fully
aware of this country's need for foreign capital. . . American
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oil companies themselves have agreed with us that all is
tranquil in the country and that the Junta is in full con¬
trol. Perhaps there have been past misunderstandings, but
these have been due to the fact that sometimes the U.S.
Government exercised no control over the companies. ...
Foreign capital will develop side by side with Venezuela
herself.1
This statement reflected the nationalists’ position relative to
the foreign oilmen. They could neither expel them immediately nor
impose regulations which would force them out. The new Junta could,
however, capitalize on American capital. Therefore, they welcomed
additional American investments but looked partly to the American govern¬
ment for protection against the manipulative practices of the oil com¬
panies. That was no doubt in deference to diplomatic protocol because
the nationalistic references to the simultaneous development of Vene¬
zuelan capital was a clear challenge to the American oil companies.
Further, the October 25th Declaration was followed by an announcement in
which the principles which would guide the Council's oil policies were
1isted.
Perez Alfonso, Minister of Development listed eight principles for
operating the oil industry:
1. Raising taxes on foreign oil companies as high as the
Venezuelan competitive position in the international
market would permit;
2. Establishing a government oil company to compete with
foreign firms for the international market, and to
receive all future concessions;
3. Establishing a state owned refinery system which would
process Venezuela crude oil;
4. Immediate efforts to conserve oil resources by gearing pro¬
duction to national needs rather than to the profit re¬
quirements of foreign oil corporations;
1
"Betancourt," New York Times, 25 October 1945.
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5. Improvement of the economic and social condition of oil
workers;
6. Use of revenues generated from taxes on oil to diversify
the economy and lessen dependence on foreign oilmen and
the food imports they sponsored;
7. Reinvestment of oil income in other productive areas
such as agriculture;
8. Sale of government royalty share of oil production as
well as production from the state-owned company in the
international market in direct competition with the U.S.
and other foreign oil companies.^
These principles represented the end of the foreign companies*
hegemony in Venezuela. In order to gain public support for the policy
national elections were set for October 27, 1946. Additionally, a cano-
paign was waged by the Council in which the need for the changes were
explained. President Betancourt observed that a new oil policy was an
absolutely necessary step in breaking the cycle of exploitation which
surrounded the oil industry.
We found the warehouses empty of food items upon assuming
responsibility for the administration. Meat, cereals, and
fat were lacking. These were the critical post war years
and money was not enough to acquire foodstuffs. It was
necessary to barter certain urgently needed raw materials,
none of which was of greater value than petroleum. ...
... In that form, the petroleum of the state was bartered
for Argentine meat, Portugese oleaginous products, babassu
nuts from Brazil to provide needed raw materials for our
national vegetable oil factories.
These operations proved that it was possible to obtain higher
prices in international markets for crude oil than the companies
operating in the country had estimated, and this fact was impor¬
tant in the relations of the government with these companies.2
^Romula Betancourt, Venezuela: Politics and Petroleum (Mexico,
D. F.: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1956), pp, 236-37*
2
Betancourt, Venezuela, pp. 238.
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The civilian dominated government's efforts to diversify the
economy was deliberate and well-planned. It was designed to strengthen
the domestic economy while reducing the relative strength of the foreign
oppression of the peasants and workers and to weaken the hold of oil
firms.
Production was being oriented three ways: (1) Studying the
characteristics of the economy and stimulating its develop¬
ment in conformity with those technological studies, (2)
undertaking those programs which, for their magnitude or
lack of attraction for private investment, require active
intervention of the state; and (3) stimulating liberally,
with the aid of credit and technical assistance, businessmen
who are dynamic and adventurous, but only when these business¬
men channel their efforts to fields in which the nation needs
production, adjusting their costs to what the consumer can
rationally pay, and agreeing to provide a level of social
welfare equivalent to that already acquired by Venezuelan
workers.1
The efforts to rebuild the economy and government repeatedly
centered on breaking the dominance of foreign oil firms. Noting that
these companies controlled millions of acres of potentially productive
land, the government passed laws in 1946 requiring oil companies to
surrender one-half the acreage they held as soon as production began in
a concession area. The extent of their land holdings is evidenced by
the fact that in 1956, after the law had been in operation for ten years
2
26 foreign companies still held 14.6 million acres.
The government encouraged oil workers to pressure for higher salar
ies and legitimized the expansion of the labor movement. In 1945 there
were 252 unions in Venezuela. By 1948 there were 1,014. Agricultural
workers had 450 unions. There were 7 national labor federations, and
^Ibid., pp. 314-15.
2
"Venezuela," World Petroleum Report. 15 January 1957.
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15 state federations. In 1947» the Confederacion de Trabajanores de
Venezuela (CTV) was formed and brought together all the labor unions
except the Partido Revolucionoir Proletario which was Communist led.
This intensification of union organization efforts resulted in 575 new
union contracts by 1948 including contracts covering the oil workers.^
The economic and political reform efforts by the Revolutionary
Government yielded some significant results. Banco Agricola y Pecuario
was subsidized by the government and was able to increase the number of
loans made to small farmers by 400 percent between 1946-48. Government
immigration programs resettled and put into production one million new
acres. Coffee production increased by 20 percent, and Cacao production
increased by 55 percent between 1945 and 1946. One million new acres of
corn was planted in 1946. Between 1945 and 1948, black bean production
went up 20 percent. Sugar production increased 20 percent. Peas
increased 100 percent and potatoes increased 75 percent. The signfi-
cance of these figures is in the fact that the production of each of
2
these crops was on the decline prior to 1945.
Revolutionary successes extended to social services also. The
number of villages with electricity increased from 322 to 600 between
1945 and 1947. Three hundred new electrical plants were constructed and
the number of people with electrical service increased by 500,000. The
number of children in school rose from 13l>000 to 500,000 between 1945
and 1948. The number of teachers increased from 8,520 to 13»500. Secon¬
dary schools increased from 29 to 48. The number of secondary school
^Alexander, The Venezuelan Revolution, p. 27.
^Ibid., pp. 27-28.
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students rose from 11,500 to 22,000. Seventy percent of the adult popu¬
lation was taught to read and write between 1945 and 1948 due to the
opening of 3»000 adult education centers. Over the same period, teacher
salaries rose by 75 percent. There were also improvements in health
care and housing.^
The Revolutionary Council instituted some important land reforms,
also. Of one hundred and sixty-eight wealthy families tried for illegally
acquiring their properties, one hundred and fifty were convicted. Their
holdings were converted into model farms and repopulated with peasants.
The Council also kept its promise to hold open elections and on
the date scheduled the national Constituent Assembly was elected. It
charged itself with the task of drawing up a new constitution. One of
its first declarations was:
In no case should the foreign petroleum companies receive
a share of annual profits superior to that received by the
state.2
Towards this end, the fifty-fifty principle was adopted and set the
standard for the relationship between oil producing states and multi¬
national oil firms. The new government also began marketing its 16 2/3
percent royalty share, of the oil produced, both domestically and inter¬
nationally in direct competition with the foreign firms.
On December 14, 194? elections were held under the new constitution
for the President, the Congress, the State Legislatures, and the Caracas
City Council. Accion Democratica won between 70 percent and 80 percent
of each election. On May 9» 1948 all other municipal elections were
^Ibid.
2
Betancourt, Venezuela, pp. 236-37.
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held, and, again Accion Democratica also won between 70 percent and
80 percent of those votes.^
Romulo Gallegos was the Accion Democratica presidential candidate
in 19^7. He received 871,752 votes out of a total of 1,183,764 votes
cast. He stated his intention to continue the Revolutionary Council's
oil policies.
The decision of the government not to extend new concessions
was also maintained, because the systems previously adopted
did not fully protect the national interest and it was not
considered proper to continue those systems as a permanent
method of disposing of our subsoil resources.2
The oil companies responded by accusing the government of halting the
growth of the oil industry. Gallegos held firm, however, and suggested
to Congress that the government proceed to organize a national oil com¬
pany.
The liberal development in Venezuela coincided with the unstable
post war transition which American oil firms were making. There de¬
veloped in 1945 in the United States a series of crippling strikes in
the refineries of the same companies which operated in Venezuela. By
October, 1945, daily production in the United States was down 37.3
3
percent due both to the labor unrest and to the post war production
slowdown. The production cut back after World War II did not decrease
oil industry insistence that events in Venezuela return to the pre-1945
^"Venezuela Elections." New York Times. 7 January 1948. Also see
Alexander, The Venezuelan Revolution, pp. 36-37.
2
Betancourt, Venezuela. pp. 236-37-
3
John W. Frey and H. Chandler Ide, eds., A History of the Petroleum
Administration for War 1941-1945 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1946), pp. 259-275.
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condition. The Wal1 Street Journal reported on October 2, 1945 that
the United States oil producers still needed additional crude sources
despite the temporary production slump. This was due to the fact that
American domestic production had been kept at record levels throughout
the war years with the result that domestic reserves were seriously
depleted. There were some major new discoveries in Oklahoma, and some
minor discoveries in Florida during the war, but not enough to meet the
expected upsurge in demand which would accompany America*s new role as
leader of the international capitalist system.
Foreign operations, then, were viewed as absolutely essential,
and American companies proceeded to expand their plants even during the
slump. Standard Oil Company of Brazil expanded its operations through¬
out South America. Standard of Indiana expanded its refining capacity
in anticipation of new supplies from Venezuela and other producer coun¬
tries. American bankers predicted that nine billion dollars v«>uld be
invested by them in foreign countries between 1945 and 1955*^ Oil was
expected to attract a large portion of this amount. State Department
and oil company representatives traveled the world in search of supplies
in much the same way they had after the first World War. Some success
was had in the Middle East but the source which was already established
was Venezuela, Therefore, it became critical to the American post-war
role that American dominance in Venezuela be re-exerted.
In the effort to reestablish American hegemony in Venezuela, there
was a merger between the political interests of the Truman Administration
("Free World” leader) and the private oil companies. In their joint
^"Post War Investment Outlook,” Wall Street Journal, 2 October 1945.
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effort to reverse the nationalists’ trend in Venezuela, the Americans
found several possible groups with which to align themselves. The com¬
munists were disaffected for having been left out of the civilian govern¬
ment. The gentry was disaffected for having been dispossessed. The
senior military officers who had been associated with the dictatorships
were disaffected for having been brushed aside in the coup and subse¬
quently, of all the groups, the latter provided the best vehicle for
not only taking but also holding the government. Both the communists
and the gentry were numerically weak and thus lacked the strength to hold
out against Accion Democratica. The communists were also ruled out be¬
cause the alliance between the West and Stalin was collapsing. The gentry,
on the other hand, would require a strong military to protect itself
against the majority party. Therefore, all the signs pointed to the
military as the only means for America to reestablish her unthreatened
position in the country.
Upon coming to power Betancourt had assigned Colonel Perez Jiminez
to liaison posts in Europe and America. Jiminez had been closely allied
with the Medina dictatorship and was known to oppose the social reforms
imposed by the civilians. He became the instrument through which Ameri¬
ca destroyed the nationalist government. The reason Betancourt assigned
Jiminez outside Venezuela was to prevent his being in a position to reverse
the reform efforts. However, this assignment provided the foreign inter¬
ests with easy access to the old line military establishment, and while
Jiminez was in America he was given training at West Point. He developed
an affinity for the United States during his stay, and upon returning to
Venezuela, Jiminez helped found the Venezuelan West Point Graduates Asso¬
ciation.
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Throughout his term in office, Betancourt sought to maintain good
relations with the United States. In 19^6 he visited Washington and
affirmed his commitment to continued cooperation with American interests
vis-a-vis international communism. However, he did not believe that
commitment mean sacrificing Venezuelan development for the benefit of
American business and political objectives. When Romulo Gallegos was
elected to office in 19^7 he continued this policy. Gallegos, however,
ignoring the advice of Betancourt, went so far as to name Jiminez Com-
mander-in-Chief of the military. This move was intended to indicate a
reconciliation between the nationalists and those officers who had
supported the dictatorship. It was also a signal to America that the
civilian government wanted closer relations. In fact the appointment
amounted to political suicide.
In less than one year after Jiminez consolidated his command, he
led a Coup d'etat which not only ended civilian rule but also began
the bloodiest period of repression in the country's history, Accion
Democratica supporters were hunted down and jailed in a concentration
camp located on an island in the middle of a river. Others were sum¬
marily executed. Betancourt and Gallegos were imprisoned and then
exiled. Over the next nine years, thousands of people lost their lives
to American weapons in the hands of troops led by graduates of West
Point.^ In fact, on the morning of the Coup an American liaison officer
was present in the barracks from which the Coupwas launched.
Jiminez destroyed the reform programs. The model farms were dis¬
banded and the gentry was allowed to reclaim the land. Funding for
^K, Bruce Galloway and Robert Johnson, Jr., West Point; America's
Power Fraternity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973)•
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for schools and health programs was cut back. Agricultural production
declined and the small businessman lost many of his subsidies. Instead
of government revenues being spent on irrigation and animal husbandry,
it was spent on high rise office buildings and shopping centers. Fur¬
ther, instead of proportionate development of rural and urban areas,
Jiminez concentrated on the major cities. Caracas became a show place
of modern office buildings, apartment complexes, theatres, stores, and
resturants. All of which were designed to appeal to foreigners and the
gentry. Foreigners were also allowed to expand their holdings at a
faster rate than the indigenous sector. The following table evidences
the fact that foreign controlled sectors grew at a faster rate under the
dictator than they did under the subsequent democratic regime.
TABLE 10
GROWTH RATES IN SELECTED SECTORS
Annual Average Growth Rates






Other Private 7.9 1.6
SOURCE: Fred D. Levy, Economic Planning in Venezuela (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. 12.
The period 1951 to 1958 saw the military rulers of which Perez
Jiminez was leader in power. The period 1959 to 1962 saw the civilians
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return to power. In the first period. Agriculture was neglected. This
was the sector on which most of the people depended for their livelihood.
Emphasis was instead placed on encouraging expansion of the petroleum
centered industries. Construction grew because the oil companies built
new refineries, and because Bethlehem and United States Steel built new
plants in the country. The other private sectors grew because Sears
Roebuck opened one of its largest chains in Venezuela during the period.
The Rockefeller family also expanded their fisheries, supermarkets and
other retail outlets under Jiminez. After the civilians came to power,
a reversal in growth sectors occurred almost immediately. Agriculture
became the fastest growing sector while petroleum growth declined by
one-third. Construction and mining achieved a negative growth while
Government spending for staff and operational expenses slowed by two-
thirds.
The development trend under the dictatorship had a particular effect
which the civilian nationalists sought to reverse. The steel plants were
locally opened to provide pipelines to the oil companies. This made it
possible for the oil industry to expand at an even greater pace with the
effect of dislocating more and more people and reversing the reforms im¬
posed by the nationalists between 19^5 and 1948. As the oil companies
and other foreign investors reabsorbed large quantities of productive
land, less was available for food production. This created opportunities
for the Rockefeller supermarket chain. In short, the direction of
development under the Jiminez dictatorship was similar in every way to
that before 1945. The oil industry, then, used their leverage with
Jiminez to reverse the effects of the social reforms.
This development can be further demonstrated by reviewing the land
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accumulation success of the oil companies for 1956 and 1957.
TABLE 11
NEW LAND ACREAGE ACdUIRED BY SELECTED






Shel1 Oi1 Company 158,445 24,710
Gulf Oil Corporation 225,685 4\
Standard Oil 124,281 471,746
Continental Oil * 250,844
Phillips Petroleum * 98,840
Atlantic Refining * 147,449
Total All Foreign Companies 893,727 2,029,426
SOURCE: World Petroleum Report, 1957 and 1958.
These lands were acquired in spite of a ten year old law prohibit¬
ing the granting of new concessions. The law had been passed by the
civilians between 19^5 and 1948 and was part of the overall effort to
diversify the economy and reduce dependency on oil revenue. Jiminez
eventually stopped Government subsidies to local businessmen and ended
funding of many social service programs. One result was that non-oil
sectors suffered and the Government became increasingly dependent on
oil taxes and royalties for revenue. In 1956, eighty-five percent of
government financing came from oil remittances.^ This placed the com¬
panies in a strong position to influence government policies. One
\evy, Economic Planning, p. 12.
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indicator of that influence is the degree of growth the companies achieved
in the area of production despite nationalists demands for conservation.
TABLE 12
VENEZUELAN PRODUCTION DURING THE JIMINEZ DICTATORSHIP





Standard Oil 823,710 982,364 1 ,044,234
Shell Oil 564,141 607,420 688,983
Gulf 292,207 316,732 348,758
Mobil Oil 66,148 70,009 90,616
Texaco 30,723 47,963 47,727
Sind ai r 20,188 24,739 29,452
SOURCE: World Petroleum Report, 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957.
Throughout the Jiminez dictatorship there were recurrent outbreaks
of violent and non-violent protest. Accion Democratica was instrumental
in these protests even though it was severely persecuted by the American
trained military and secret police. Prison camps were set up in secluded
regions of the country for the incarceration of political dissidents. In
the last half of the dictatorship (1955 to 1958) urban guerrilla activity
increased. Museums would be raided and whole exhibitions held for poli¬
tical ransom.^ These kinds of tactics—especially against exhibitions
on loan from foreign countries—achieved maximum political impact. On
^Alexander, The Venezuelan Revolution, p. I8l.
90
other occasions nationwide strikes would take place. Despite these
facts, the American oil industry viewed the situation in Venezuela as
satisfactory. In early 1957 the industry publication, World Petroleum
Report, made the following evaluation of conditions in Venezuela:
The principal national factors affecting oil investments and
operations in Venezuela are the political climate, the legal
regulations of the industry, and the economic situation. As
regards the first, the political situation appears stable.
The legal situation as concerns oil is generally satisfactory.
. . . The Hydrocarbons Law of 1943, still in effect, has its
drawbacks and is expensive. ... One of the principal factors
is the economic picture, . . Generally, the picture is favor¬
able.^
The stable political situation to which the industry referred
included a dictator who disallowed public elections and who was highly
amenable to bribery. It also included active communist support for that
dictatorship and hostility for the Accion Democratica Party. It also
included the systematic hunting down and persecution of political dissi¬
dents who were often kept in permanent isolation.
The generally satisfactory legal situation was created when Jiminez
decided to grant new concessions and allowed unlimited production in
spite of nationalist efforts to impose conservation measures.
The favorable economic conditions occurred because Jiminez ignored
calls to establish a national oil company to compete with the foreigners.
Former President Betancourt, from his exile in Mexico, held a
different view of conditions in Venezuela. He kept up a barrage of
rejections of Jiminez’s claims of economic development in Venezuela and
2
he detailed the exploitative nature of the oil firms. The companies
^"Venezuela," World Petroleum Report. 15 January 1957, pp» 264-65.
2
See Betancourt, Venezuela, Chapter one.
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fought to soften their images of being imperialistic and anti-democratic.
They launched a propaganda campaign which was designed to establish their
legitimacy. Creole Petroleum Company, a Standard of New Jersey subsidi¬
ary and Venezuela's largest producer, started a newspaper called El Farol.
The Gulf Oil subsidiary and Venezuela's second largest producer, Mene
Grande, began publishing El Disco Anaraniada. The Shell Oil organ was
named La Revista Shell.
Each of these publications were lavishly illustrated. They leaned
toward cultural items and news not related to oil or public suffering.
The intent was to create the illusion that the oil companies were cul¬
tural institutions and not arms of international and monopolistic capi¬
talism. Augmenting the newspapers were charitable foundations which
sponsored sporting events and other recreational activities. The oil
companies hoped that these efforts would soften public criticism of them
and halt the nationalistic demands that the oil industry be brought under
the control of a democratic government. However, they had failed to
gauge the depths of public commitment to end their suffering at the hands
of both military dictators and foreign investors. In 1958, when it be¬
came apparent that democratic rule would not be restored by Perez
Jiminez, as he had promised, the people revolted and succeeded in both
seating a democratic government and gaining ultimate control over their
oil resources.
After the democratic forces exerted themselves in 1958, the oil com¬
panies left no doubt as to their attitude.
During 1958, elections were held following the ouster of
Jiminez. The victor was Romulo Betancourt, leader of the
Democratic Action Party and new President of Venezuela.
His attitude toward the oil industry is one of studied
criticism ....
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The outgoing gesture of the . . . Junta (which replaced
Jiminez) . . . Just before Betancourt's installation . . .
in December 1958 was to increase the income tax. From a
former maximum of 26% it jumped to a retroactive (through
1958) maximum of kS% .... The reaction of the oil com¬
panies was one of indignation and surprise; the Junta had
promised not to pass legislation affecting the oil indus¬
try. . . .1
The United States oil companies immediately took steps to retali¬
ate against both the provisional and constitutional governments, and in
so doing, against the majority of the Venezuelan people. The steps
were outlined as follows:
The increase in the income tax may be offset in part by a
readjustment in the valuation of crude for royalty purposes.
While the valuation did not make much difference under the
5O-5O concept, it now assumes more importance, and the cono-
panies are pressing for a more realistic value on production
and on the government's royalty share.2
The clear intent of the oil companies was to revalue downward the price
of Venezuelan crude in order to punish the government for increasing
taxes. The fact that the firms could do this is testimony to the nega¬
tive benefits of foreign monopoly control over primary resources.
The monopoly control over Venezuela's oil resources permitted the
companies to enjoy a 6-day work week and keep wages down to an average
of $1.80 an hour. In the United States, oil workers were earning in
excess of $3.50 per hour and only working five days a week. Further,
the strategic position of the oil industry allowed it to create condi¬
tions which either attracted or discouraged other foreign investors.
During the Jiminez dictatorship, the oil industry encouraged other indus-
triesto invest in Venezuela. When the democratic regime came to power.
^"Venezuela," World Petroleum Report. 15 February 1959, p. 156.
^Ibid.
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the oil companies moved to block other investors. In early 1961, the
industry evaluated developing conditions in Venezuela and reported that:
Almost every aspect influencing investment in Venezuela
worsened during I960 and early 1961.^
United States oil firms led a $600 million flight of capital out of
Venezuela in I960 alone. This effort was an attempt by the foreign oil
firms to force the democratic Venezuelan Government not to threaten
the interests of the oil industry.
A propaganda program was also launched by the oil firms to dis¬
credit the democratic leadership and its nationalistic policies:
President Betancourt has set April 19, I960 as the date of
formation of the new National Oil Company, which is to be
founded by the government to develop known productive areas.
It is indicative of the deteriorating relations between the
government and the companies. Partly, this is due to Com¬
munist influence.^
The leaders of Venezuela after 1958 were exactly the same leaders who
in 19^5 had rejected Communist participation in the government. They
were the same men whom the Communists had consistently fought against.
The charge that the Communists in the government inspired the national¬
istic programs was a deliberate deception since the communists were not
allowed to participate. Further, the contention that the Venezuelan
Government's decision to establish its own oil company contributed to a
deteriorating relationship between the companies and the government sug¬
gests that the relationship could have been improved if the government
had decided to support the foreign monopoly.
^"Venezuela." World Petroleum Report, 15 February 1961, p. 248.
^Ibid.
3
"Venezuela." World Petroleum Report. 15 February I960, p. 111.
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Econcxnic destabilization was central to the companies' efforts.
Three months before the 1958 elections there were 20,078 operating wells
in Venezuela. Within six months after the elections, 4,272 were abandoned
by the foreign firms and production had stopped on an additional 6,356.
The number of productive wells had been cut by 10,628 or 52.85 percent.^
The oil companies let it become known that the nationalistic policies
of the new government were the reasons for their actions:
Significant changes during 1958 in the income-tax law
amount almost to a complete revision. ...
During early 1959, the government made extensive changes
in the regulations to the 1943 oil law which are so exten¬
sive that, in effect, they change the law itself. They
include more stringent regulations of gas use, prorationing
regulations, and wel1-dri11ing restrictions. . .
The firms objected to the Venezuelans' enacting the very same con¬
servation laws which oil producing states within the United States had
legislated twenty years previously with the encouragement of the com¬
panies themselves.
The destabilization effort continued throughout 1959 and into I960.
In the first quarter of 1959, production was 3,014,000 barrels and de¬
clined to 2,814,000 barrels by the fourth quarter. These moves had the
effect of denying the democratic regime the much needed revenues with
which it could carry out economic and social reforms. The intent was to
create a long term austerity situation which involved a continued deple¬
tion of known reserves and a cutback in activities essential to main¬
taining reserve levels. Therefore, the oil firms did not shut off pro-
^"Venezuela." World Petroleum Report. 15 February 1959, p. 152.
^Ibid., p. 156.
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duction altogether. Instead, they reduced drilling by 45 percent and
reduced exploratory activity by 53 percent. These declines began in
early 1959 and were achieved within twelve months. Oil payments to the
government declined by 15.4 percent between 1958 and 1959 despite the
fact that in 1958 the government increased taxes on oil. There was then
a concerted effort to create a short term financial crisis and to gen¬
erally weaken the Venezuelan economy in the long run. The firms* over¬
all objective was to demonstrate that the economy could not function
without them,^
This same effort had been attempted in Mexico between 1900 and
1938. It ultimately failed because nationalistic and democratic forces
persisted until they eventually won. In Venezuela, democratic and na¬
tionalistic forces persisted also. The efforts of the oil firms to deny
the government revenues by cutting back production together with the
United States Government*s refusal to grant Venezuela a guaranteed
2
"country of origin" oil import quota was countered by developing alterna¬
tive markets in Europe. Venezuelan exports to Europe were up 23 percent
between I960 and 1962. Some Common Market countries increased imports
3
from Venezuela by 50 percent. The founding of CVP, the Venezuelan
National Petroleum Company, in I960 helped to push production back up
so that by 1962 production was 9.6 percent above 1961. CVP also drilled
ten successful wells in 1962 and discovered 65.4 million barrels of new
crude reserves. By early 1963» CVP operated a refinery and chain of
^Ibid.
2
"Venezuela," World Petroleum Report. 15 February I960, p, 120,
3
"Venezuela." World Petroleum Report, 15 February 1963.
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service stations. This move towards integration helped the government to
achieve a record income from its oil operations in 1962 of $1,046,000,000.^
The efforts of United States oil firms to punish the government and
cripple the economy by unilaterally reducing prices was countered with
the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
which held its second conference in Caracas on January 16, 1961. (OPEC)
has since taken the authority to establish crude prices away from the
companies.
Summary
There are many similarities between the Mexican and Venezuelan
experiences with multinational oil corporations. In both countries,
the oil firms identified the stability of their investments with authori¬
tarian forms of governments and so supported dictators who repressed
any attempt at social change. As a consequence the private oil interests
were able to improve their earnings in both countries while the living
conditions of the majority of the people worsened. From this disfran¬
chised majority there arose demands for strict regulation of the oil
interests which dominated the economies of both countries. In both
instances, the dictators were unsympathetic to these demands and extra-
legal means were employed to remove them so that democratically elected
officials could come to power. The oil firms responded to the removal
of the dictators in both instances by organizing support from the American
Government and other American businesses against the democratic regimes.
The nationalists in Venezuela and Mexico failed to establish democratic
hbid.
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governments on their first attempt due to the efforts of the oil companies.
However, in both countries the nationalists were eventually able to gain
control over the oil industries and begin programs of social reform.
Significantly, in each instance the oil multinationals began a deliberate
program to destabilize the countries' economies after it became apparent
that the dictatorships would be destroyed. The competition between
European and American oil companies which began in Mexico carried over
into Venezuela with the same results. Both Venezuela and Mexico became
important suppliers of petroleum in support of American allies in World
Wars. The economies of both countries became dependent upon oil revenue
and the oil firms which controlled the international market. In short,
between the two countries there were no significant differences in the
effects of foreign private ownership of oil. Nor was a significant change
in the political manipulations of the oil companies from one country and
period to another.
As the United States claimed more and more privileges as world
policemen following World War II, she became increasingly brutal towards
countries which failed to follow her lead. This was especially true of
developing countries who were dependent in some way upon American trade
and aid. In countries such as these, the interests of the American
government became inseparable from the interests of American businessmen.
As the previous two chapters have shown, the oil industry enjoyed an
especially close relationship with the United States Government. The
following chapter will show how this relationship made it possible for
the oil companies to undertake foreign policy initiatives of their own.
CHAPTER IV
CUBA: OIL POLITICS IN AN IMPORTER-CONSUMER NATION
Cuba's relationship to the international oil companies was con¬
ditioned by the fact that she was a consumer rather than a producer
of oil. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the involvement of
the firms in the Cuban Revolution and to determine how Cuba's role of
oil consumer conditioned the political activities of the oil companies.
As in the case studies of Mexico and Venezuela, this chapter will place
the Cuban Revolution in historical perspective. This will be done by
outlining the development of the competing forces and by determining to
which of them the American Government and oil companies aligned them¬
selves.
This chapter will not detail the history of oil company penetra¬
tion of Cuba as was done in the previous two chapters. Since Cuba never
became a significant producer of oil, the oil companies did not play the
same role in her political development as they did in Venezuela and
Mexico. Cuba's economy was keyed to the sugar industry and as a result
the most significant efforts at early reform was directed at that indus¬
try. Oil became an object of nationalist reform efforts after the
Socialist Revolution of 1958. It was at that time that the American oil
companies became active in the way they had in the two countries studied
above. Therefore, this study will focus on oil industry activity after
that point. However, in order to place that activity into historical
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context it is necessary to trace Cuba’s political development and Ameri¬
can involvement in that development from pre-independence to the period
about which this chapter is primarily concerned.
American involvement in Cuba is historically tied to the national¬
ists and liberal movements of that country. The direction of American
involvement was towards defeating these movements and insuring that Cuba
served American political and economic needs. In I898, when Cuba was
taken from Spain by the United States, along with the Philippines,
American political leaders were maneuvering to consolidate this country’s
dominance over Latin America. Cuba was strategically placed to form the
axis of U. S. naval strategy in the Caribbean. Cuba also represented
the most significant Spanish holding in an area claimed by the United
States since 1823.
The domestic forces pushing hardest for U. S. expansion into Latin
America was the business community. At the time, Cuba was perhaps as
attractive to American investors as Mexico where gold and silver were
known to exist. Cuba’s attraction lay in the fact that she was relatively
more developed than her Latin American neighbors; she was a prolific pro¬
ducer of sugar; and her climate was conducive to year round vacation
living. In the decades following I898, American businesses located in
Cuba in increasing numbers; Cuba’s economy became dominated by American
investors and a thriving resort industry developed.
American oil companies never exercised the control over Cuba that
they enjoyed in Mexico and Venezuela. This was because the key industry
in Cuba was sugar, and because relatively little oil was discovered
there. Cuba’s significance for the American oil industry was in the
facts of her consumption. More petroleum products were consumed per
TOO
capita in Cuba than in any other Latin American country. American oil
companies supplied Cuba from their holdings in Mexico and Venezuela.
Cuba was the perfect outlet; she had a high demand and almost no local
supplies. Additionally, she was a captive of the American oil firms
since they alone could supply her.
This monopoly was not seriously challenged until 1959 when the
Soviet Union offered to barter crude oil for Cuban sugar. This offer not
only threatened the position of the oil firms but also of the American
government. Further, the Soviet offer to Cuba coincided with similar
offers to India, Italy, Japan and other markets dominated by Americans.
The American oil companies and government saw this as a concerted effort
by the Soviet Union to undermine America*s strategic and economic position
in the world. The offer to Cuba was particularly threatening because of
her proximity to the United States and because it was a challenge to
America's claim of dominance over Latin America.
The reaction from America to the Cuban socialist efforts at social
reforms was to see the entire episode as a Soviet inspired plot. The
failure to accurately evaluate the historical development of Cuba reflected
itself in the policy adopted towards the Castro regime. Instead of see¬
ing Castro as a continuation of nationalist efforts to throw off foreign
domination, the United States concluded that the Soviets were attempting
to out-maneuver them. As a result, America adopted a policy of isolating
both Cuba and Russia from the rest of the world. Other Latin American
states were bribed and coerced into following suit. American oil com¬
panies set the pace for the American business community by establishing
a trade boycott of their own against both the Soviet Union and Cuba.
The economic destabilization of Cuba was launched even though the
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companies risked having their properties nationalized. The risks were
taken because of the demonstration effect the destabilization effort
would have on other countries. Therefore, the involvement of American
oil companies in the Cuban Revolution must be viewed within the context
of the world wide objectives of the oil industry. Whereas the revolution
itself must be viewed within the context of the historical development
of Cuba herself.
The earliest expressions of Cuban nationalism grew out of the inde¬
pendence movements. Joaquin Infante was one of the earliest nationalists
to challenge Spanish rule in Cuba. In 1809, he petitioned Spain for
independence and drew up a constitution as the basis for self-government.
Infante's efforts reflected the growing sentiment of the privileged class
of Creoles who ruled Cuba in behalf of the Spanish Crown. However, it
was not until ten years later that the nationalists achieved the degree
of organizational development necessary to make themselves heard.
During the I820*s the Rayos de Soles De Bolivar became the dominant
movement for Cuban independence. Inspired by the successes of Simon
Bolivar and the disintegration of the Spanish empire, and the independence
movements in Mexico, the Rayos lobbied throughout the country for inde¬
pendence. Social clubs and Masonic lodges were the primary arenas of
Rayos activity. This fact points to the class origins of the movement
as well as to the ultimate cause for its lack of success.
Only privileged people could afford to indulge in Social clubs and
support secret fraternal organizations such as the Masons. Among this
class were both slave owners and non-slave owners. The former supported
independence as a step towards establishing a government which protected
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their interests against those of both foreigners and abolitionists. The
latter were less committed to slavery. Some even envisioned an inde¬
pendent Cuba without slavery, and where the power of the landed gentry
was kept in check.
Carlos Manuel Cespedes was such a person. Although a slave owner,
his livelihood was not dependent on slave labor because he was a lawyer.
Cespedes joined the nationalist movement in protest against the violent
political repression practiced by the Spanish Monarchy and the Cuban
aristocracy. A small but effective group of writers, painters, poets,
lawyers, and other professionals joined Cespedes in 1868 and declared
Cuba independent. Several plantation owners endorsed the declaration
as the only alternative to permanent domination by Spain.
The movement was split between persons favoring abolition of slavery
and persons supporting it. These factions became the liberal and conser¬
vative wings, respectively, of the independence movement. The liberals
argued that in order to raise an army to defend the declaration of inde¬
pendence the slaves would have to be set free and recruited into the
effort. The conservatives felt that the slaves need only be freed from
other duties while they fought. Cespedes did little to reconcile these
differences. Although he freed his slaves, he did not, and probably
could not, require others to do so. Nevertheless, an army was raised
from among a combination of slaves and freed men and it enjoyed con¬
siderable success against superior Spanish forces.
The independence army, made up of Blacks and mulattoes primarily,
was led by Maximo Gomez, a Dominican skilled in guerrilla warfare.
Gomez’s strategy was to wage an economic destabilization campaign. He
would attack the wealth producing sugar mills and plantations, destroying
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both crops and equipment and freeing slaves. This approach hurt Spain
in three wayss First, it cost Spain to maintain large standing armies
in defensive positions around widely scattered plantations and cities.
Second, it denied her a needed source of revenue making it necessary to
draw funds from other sources to pay for the war effort in Cuba. Third,
it crippled the Cuban economy making the cost of success increasingly
prohibitive for Spain.
The problems caused by these efforts for the conservatives were
equally damaging, however. It was not possible for Gomez to conduct a
serious economic campaign against Spain without disrupting the planta¬
tions and slave-holding of conservative elements within the independence
movement. This fact caused many conservatives to quit the movement.
Others lobbied for a change in Gomez's strategy. Their suggestion was
that the army be used exclusively against Spanish military forces and
not against the plantations or slavery. Gomez responded by stating that
If independence is not given to the slaves and if production
of the great sugar plantations is not impeded, the revolution
is destined to last much longer and rivers of blood will flow
unfruitfully in the fields of the island.^
The logic of this argument was missed by the conservatives. The
logic under which they operated was that independence without the privi¬
leges they had previously enjoyed was not worth having. Their tactic
was to rally white sentiment against blacks in the movement. The target
of their attack was Antonio Maceo, a mulatto who was Gomez's most suc¬
cessful field ccximander. Maceo was accused of maneuvering to establish
1
Quoted in Jaime Suchlicki, Cuba From Columbus to Castro (New York
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. 80.
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a black republic in Cuba modeled after Haiti. The charge had the effect
of weakening white liberal support for the leadership of the movement.
Maceo addressed the racist effort by stating that:
In planting these seeds of distrust and dissention, they
do not seem to realize that it is the country that will
suffer. ... I must protest most energetically that
neither now nor at any other time am I to be regarded as
an advocate of a Negro Republic. ... This concept is a
deadly thing to the Democratic Republic which is founded
on the basis of liberty and fraternity.!
Of course, Gomez was wrong as far as the Conservatives were con¬
cerned. They did not envision a republic in which either liberty, fra¬
ternity or democracy would be extended to slaves. They demonstrated
this fact in 1872 when they pressured Cespedes into demoting both Gomez
and Maceo, In 1874, Cespedes was himself ousted and subsequently betrayed
to Spanish troops who killed him. Following that, the Conservatives
entered into a settlement with Spain wherein slavery was preserved.
The situation in Cuba in 1878 was similar to the situation in
Mexico in 1911. In both cases Conservatives aligned themselves with
foreign interests in an attempt to maintain the status quo. Liberal
elements continued to resist in both countries. In Mexico, Pancho Villa
refused to recognize the Madero regime. In Cuba, Maceo and his guerril¬
las also refused to lay down their arms. Instead, they continued raiding
plantations and freeing slaves. This had the effect of denying the Con¬
servatives much of the benefit they had hoped a settlement with Spain
would bring.
In fact, the Cuban slaveocracy received several additional blows
in the post-settlement period. First, the disruption of the economy—
^Ibid.
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particularly the sugar industry—resulted in the loss of foreign markets
to European beet sugar producers. Second, Spain abolished slavery in
Cuba in 1886. Third, in 1894 Spain imposed an embargo on Cuban sugar
and tobacco shipments to the United States.^ The combined effect of
these blows was to accelerate the bankruptcy of the gentry much the same
way as those in Mexico were bankrupted by the devaluation of the peso
and related developments between 1900 and 1910.
Spain's destabilization of Cuba's economy was as calculated as
the American destabilization of Mexico and Venezuela (and later Cuba).
The goal of Spain's efforts was the destruction of both the independ¬
ence and annexation movements. Prior to 1864 and the loss of the Ameri¬
can Civil War by the South, the annexation movement in Cuba had con¬
siderable momentum. After that time the movement lost its hope of en¬
tering the Union as a slave state. However, the Cuban slaveocracy
would point to the fact that American businessmen and the American
Government encouraged slavery in Mexico up to 1910, and draw comfort
from that fact. The possibility that Cuban slave owners would reach an
accommodation with the United States with slavery still intact on the
Island was, for Spain, a real threat. Abolishing slavery had the effect
of disrupting the agricultural industries from which America could draw
benefits.
The United States was the ultimate beneficiary anyway. Spain's
destabilization had the same effect that America's destabilization of
Mexico and Venezuela. It stimulated a transfer of loyalty within the
^Hugh Thomas, The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row,
1971), pp. 247 & 271. Also see Stephen Glissold, Latin America: New
World Third World (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 124.
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gentry. In Mexico, Britain benefitted from America's alienation of the
gentry and President Diaz. In Venezuela, the United States was not
seriously challenged by another outside power and alienated elements
within the gentry's class supported the nationalist movement. Like¬
wise, Spain's destabilization of Cuba strengthened the demands for
independence. Further, the bankruptcy of the gentry created investment
opportunities for American capital. The opportunity for unhampered
American investment was provided by the mysterious sinking of an Ameri¬
can naval ship in Havana harbor in 1898. The United States blamed Spain
for the incident and in the subsequent war took possession of Cuba and
the Philippines.
The Havana harbor incident was similar to the Tampico Bay incident
which followed 15 years later. In both instances America seized terri¬
tory in response to an ambiguous threat to her sovereignty. In both
instances, American investors enjoyed a period of growth in the wake of
the territorial seizures. In the fifty-nine years after the occupation
of Cuba, American investors came to own four-fifths of all industrial
assets there. Approximately two-thirds of all Cuban imports originated
in the United States. Americans came to monopolize the electric, petro¬
leum, mining, paper, pharmaceutical, paint, fertilizer, and rubber indus¬
tries. Additionally, in 19^1 Americans purchased 100 percent of the
sugar crop for the record low price of $0.0265 per pound.^
Cuba's government also came under American control. In 1901 after
Spain had been defeated, America "legitimated” her domination of the
^Glissold, Latin America, pp. 128-129.
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island by way of the Platt Amendment.^ The amendment carried the name
of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and was
attached to the defense appropriations bill which financed the occupation
of Cuba. The amendment gave the United States the right to veto any com¬
mercial or diplomatic contact Cuba might establish with other countries,
and it also gave the United States the right to "intervene" directly
whenever it felt it necessary. Maximo Gomez described the Platt Amend-
2
ment as reducing "Cuban sovereignty to a myth."
The amendment did have the effect of extending the American per¬
ception of the status quo of 1823- In that year the Monroe Doctrine
was established as the cornerstone of American policy towards Latin
America. Under it America claimed exclusive right to hegemony in the
Western Hemisphere. At the time Cuba was still a Spanish colony and
America could not uniformly enforce her claim. The Spanish-American War
changed that and made the United States totally supreme in Latin America.
As important as the Platt Amendment was to American domination of
Cuba, it was but one dimension of that domination. Another, and perhaps a
more important factor was American control over the political leadership
of the country. American businessmen and the American Government contri¬
buted equally to subverting Cuba's leaders. Businessmen exercised their
control both through the economy and through campaign financing. Their
control over the economy meant that economic policies were made by Ameri¬
cans regardless of who held political office. Through campaign financing
^U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agree¬
ments of the United States of America; 1776 to 1949. "Cuba," Vol. 2
(Washington, D. C., 1962),
2
Suchlicki, Cuba, p. 98.
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Americans were able to influence the leadership selection process. For
instance, North American capital financed the 1913 election of Mario
Garcia Menocal who later made the first commercial grants of concessions
to American oil companies. He was followed in 1921 by Alfred Zayas who
was financed by J. P. Morgan. Zayas left office in 1924 and was replaced
by Gerardo Machado. Electric Bond and Share of New York gave Machado
$500,000 for his campaign expenses. Subsequently, Machado cooperated
with the firm's efforts to establish a monopoly over electrical power
generation and sales in Cuba. Prior to his election to the Presidency,
Machado had been director of Electric Bond and Share's Cuban affiliate.
Nationalist pressure forced Machado to resign in 1933 but his successor
was hand picked by Benjamin Sumner Wells, an official of the United
States State Department. Carlos Manuel Cespedes, Machado's replacement
lasted one month before nationalists ousted him. The next year Flugencio
Batista emerged as the dominant figure in both the Cuban military and
government. Wells described him in December 1933 as the only person in
Cuba capable of maintaining order.^
The disorder to which Wells was referring was nationalists' efforts
to repeal the Platt Amendment and to break American hegemony over Cuba's
economy. When the American forces occupied Cuba in 1898, the Cuban
liberation army was prohibited from entering urban areas. This not only
placed the United States Marine Corps between the liberation army and the
people, it also made it possible for a settlement (i.e., the Platt Amend¬
ment) to be imposed without serious challenge from nationalist forces.
In 1908 Black Cubans revolted after the puppet regime refused to allow
^Thomas, The Pursuit of Freedom, pp. 260-293. Also see Suchlicki,
Cuba, p. 101.
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them to organize their own political party. The United States Marines
were used to destroy their forces which were operating in Oriente
Province. Again in 1917» nationalists revolted against the fraudulent
reelection of Menocal, and again United States Marines were called upon
to smash the movement.^
Nationalists rebelled so forcefully against Zayas in 1924, that
President Harding dispatched a special envoy, Enoch Crowder, to name a
new Cuban cabinet. This effort at cosmetic change together with the
subsequent attempt by Wells both ultimately failed. Therefore, when
Batista was labelled the only person able to bring order it spoke to
America's growing problems with Cuban nationalists.
The American position was saved by the rise of Batista, a mulatto
sergeant, who had served Machado in his persecution of progressives and
students. After Cespedes was overthrown, a pentarchy was established.
A Conservative member promoted Batista to Colonel without consulting
the other four. As a result, a second member resigned and the pentarchy
collapsed. Batista, however, retained his promotion and became a power¬
ful force in the Cuban military and in politics. After the pentarchy
collapsed, the leadership vacuum was filled by the students' movement who
declared Dr. Ramon Grau, a University of Havana Professor, President.
Sumner Wells described Batista as "the only individual in Cuba today who
2
represents authority" and, therefore, encouraged him to remove Grau.
Two months later, in December, 1973» Wells was replaced by Jefferson
Caffrey, the United States diplomat who helped engineer Juan Vincente
^Suchlicki, Cuba, pp. 87-88 & 98.
^Ibid., p. 130.
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Gomez’s rise to power in Venezuela. Caffrey loathed the nationalists
and students' movement and described it as "inept and unpopular with all
the better classes in the country .... It is supported only by the
army and ignorant masses who have been misled by utopian promises."^
Caffrey continued to encourage Batista to seize control of the government.
Finally, Batista acted and pressured Grau into resigning. Grau later
explained the tactic used against him:
The dividing factor which led to my final resignation aside
from the perturbing influence of illegitimate interests and
the handiwork of Mr. Caffrey, was my refusal to grant an
extension of military jurisdiction repeatedly requested by
(Batista), . . which would have prevented ordinary courts of
justice from judging coamon crimes committed by members of
the Armed forces.2
Batista, with the encouragement of American governmental and business
circles had pressured for increasing autonomy for the military. Had Grau
granted his demands, the military would have become an uncontrolled and
powerful force in Cuban politics in much the same way it was in Venezuela,
Further, American encouragement and support was programmed towards achiev¬
ing just such a result in both countries. Batista, for instance, had
been promised U. S. recognition, which had been withheld from Grau, if
he revolted. Three days after Grau’s resignation diplomatic recognition
was extended by the United States State Department.
For the next six years the United States ruled Cuba through Batista
who in turn ruled through a series of puppet presidents. It was during
this time that the Platt Amendment was repealed by Cuba. However, as




than to nationalism on the part of Batista:
The repeal of the Platt Amendment marked the United States’
approval of the regime and the ruthless suppression of
another general strike in 1935» followed by the murder of
Antionio Guiteras who had been the most dynamic figure in
the Grau administration ... ,1
In 1940, Batista was elected President with the aid and sympathy
of American businessmen. The following year he sold the entire sugar
crop to the United States for the record low price of $0.0265 per
2
pound. The U. S, also brought Cuba into World War II. Cuban tax¬
payers supported the effort even though the masses were impoverished,
and could not expect to benefit from an American victory. In fact, in
1952 when Batista returned from exile to establish his second military
dictatorship-after having been ousted by nationalists between 1944
and 1952—living conditions continued to decline for a majority of
Cubans.
This pattern of development was consistent with that inspired by
American activities in Venezuela. There, between 1945 and 1948, nation¬
alists stimulated growth in sectors of the economy not under foreign
control. When the Jiminez dictatorship was established the pattern of
development swung back in favor of American investors. In Cuba the same
thing was noticeable. The last year of Batista’s first dictatorship
(1944) saw Cuban capital owning fifty-five sugar mills and producing
twenty-two percent of the country’s output. By 1952, the last year of
nationalist rule, there were one hundred and thirteen Cuban owned mills
accounting for fifty-five percent of annual production. Foreign capital
^Glissold, Latin America, p. 128,
^Ibid.
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lost ground under nationalists in both countries.^
Batista reversed this trend much the same as Jiminez was doing at
the same time. In the last year of Batista's second dictatorship,
American capital could claim 85 percent of annual sugar production.
Additionally, 75 percent of all Cuban imports came from the United States
and 66 percent of her exports went to the United States. Batista also
rewrote the petroleum laws to provide 50 percent government financing
2of the oil firms' high risk exploration and development costs.
Most Cubans did not receive the same help from the government. In
1956 unemployment reached 17 percent. Another 36 percent was under¬
employed in service occupations. A large number of these worked as domes-
3tics for wealthy Cuban and foreign families. These conditions fed the
nationalist movement much the same way Spain's destabilization effort
caused the nationalists to close ranks. Fidel Castro represented one
segment among the nationalists who felt that armed struggle was not only
necessary but could succeed in bringing about change in Cuba. By 1958
they were proven correct and Fidel Castro assumed leadership of the govern¬
ment.
This development brought American oil companies into direct con¬
flict with the nationalists. Oil was a key sector of the Cuban economy.
It provided the energy for the foreign dominated industries. When the
Castro regime came to power in 1959» oil was providing 98 percent of the
country's energy needs. This is compared with 20 percent in India for




the same year. The sheer dependence of the Cuban economy on oil placed
the firms in a strong position to exert pressure on the new rulers. The
available evidence suggests that while American businesses in general
conspired to destroy the Castro government, the oil companies were the
principal initiators of the effort.
The direction of the oil companies' involvement in the Cuban Revo¬
lution was set prior to the overthrow of Batista. In 1957 when the
revolutionaries were gaining momentum throughout the island, American
oil companies concluded that a victory for the revolutionaries would be
against their best interests. They began to formulate plans to counter¬
act any reform efforts the revolutionaries might attempt. This effort
was reflected in the industry publication. World Petroleum Report for
1958.
Political stability was the only factor affecting investment
favorability which changed drastically during 1957. The
government of President Batista is threatened by a revolution
led from within the country .... A revolution would lead
to a less favorable government attitude? but since Cuba is
closely tied economically to the United States, the general
attitude would probably remain friendly.2
The oil companies realized that Batista could not survive and
that only the combined leverage of American capital could inhibit eco¬
nomic reform. The opportunity for American capital to take advantage
of its position came within months after Batista was ousted. The
revolutionary government moved to maximize the worth of Cuban sugar and
save scarce foreign exchange by bartering for Soviet crude oil. American
^Michael Tanzer, The Political Economy of International Oil and
the Underdeveloped Countries (Boston; Beacon Press, 1969)» pp. 332-333.
2
"Cuba," World Petroleum Report. 15 January 1958.
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owned refineries and retailers were asked to process and market this oil
along with that provided by their parent companies. Standard and Texaco
were two of the largest multinationals operating in Cuba, They all
refused the revolutionaries* request to handle Soviet oil. One report
has concluded that this refusal was the first shot in the United States'
war on Castro and his government:
The refusal to*refine the oil was intended to precipitate a
crisis, • . . The companies believed that the Cubans would
come to a halt. The revolutionary government would be forced
to relent and change its program. Its alternative was, of
course, to ask the Soviets for technicians and equipment, and
to rely on them for help in general. The United States Govern¬
ment and the private oil companies were willing to take this
gamble, for they apparently believed that a Cuba in which
United States interests were expropriated or made unprofitable
was little better than a communist country anyway,1
The refusal did in fact set a series of events into motion which
resulted in a confrontation between the firms and the Cuban Government.
On June 7, I960 the oil companies informed the Cubans that they would
refuse to process the Soviet oil. This refusal was part of an overall
effort to create an internal crisis that would bring the nationalist
government down. The oil companies and the American government had the
same objectives in 1913 when General Huerta ousted Madero, and in 1959
when the Venezuelan nationalists ousted Jiminez. The Americans had
less success against Castro, however, because he refused to be intimi¬
dated, and four days after their refusal he warned the companies that
he would take strong action against them. The Soviet oil had not arrived
at that point and the opportunity for compromise still existed. The oil
companies refused to concede to any of the government's demands, however,
and in turn, the government became more confiscatory in its actions. In
1
Tanzer, Political Economy, p. 332.
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October, 1959 the Cuban Government expropriated all records of the oil
companies. The next month it raised the royalty on oil production to
60 percent.^ These moves followed the companies' attempts to deny the
government revenue and oil supplies by cutting back production and
imports. They also followed a work slow down throughout the industry
by U.S. personnel.
The companies prepared to shut down their plants rather than
refine Soviet crude, even small amounts. They let their crude
stocks fall and began to send wives, children, and some Ameri¬
can employees back to the United States. The deadlock threat¬
ened to paralyze the transporation system and leave Cuba with¬
out electric power.2
The Castro Government reminded the companies of the terms of the
1938 Petroleum Law which was the basic legislation affecting petroleum
in Cuba. Under its terms, the government could require the companies to
refine "government crude." The companies rejected this demand and in¬
formed the government that that law only applied to oil produced within
Cuba and not to oil which was simply owned by the Cuban Government. This
interpretation placed the oil companies in the position of being the
highest authority on Cuban law.
The companies contend this applies only to Cuban-produced
oil. Texaco is especially vehement on this point, since
it built its refinery under terms of Law-Decree 1758 of
November 2, 1958 which repealed all laws in conflict with
it ... .3
Law-Decree 1758 was part of a package of "incentives" granted U.S.
oil companies during Batista's last term as Cuba's dictator. Most of
^"Cuba," World Petroleum Report. 15 January 1956.
2
J. P. Murray, The Second Revolution in Cuba (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1967)» p. 102.
^"Cuba," World Petroleum Report. 15 January 1961.
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these incentives were anti-nationalistic in that they favored foreign
interests over those of the Cuban people. On July 8, 195^1 Batista
issued Law Decree Number 1526 which exempted the oil companies from
taxes on capital and on capital imports for ten years. It also provided
for a ten-year exemption on the profits tax; a successive reduction of
the surface land tax from six cents per acre to two cents per acre over
five years; and a host of other measures, including 50 percent govern¬
ment financing for some exploration programs.^ Law Decree 1758 and Law
Decree 1756 were just two of the measures imposed by Batista which led
the World Petroleum Report to conclude in early 1958 that:
The national attitude towards foreign investment is favorable
as concerns the government. There are no restrictions placed
on foreign ownership of domestic corporations nor restrictions
as to nationality or residence of directors or shareholders,
nor any prohibition against holding directors' meetings outside
Cuba. There are no exchange regulations against the U.S. dol¬
lar and no restrictions on the right to import and/or export
capital, except in the case of sugar. . . .2
The Castro Government could not relieve the economy as long as these
laws were enforced. He, therefore, moved to substitute nationalistic oil
laws for the anti-nationalistic measures issued by Batista. In 1959
and i960, Castro cancel led all requests for exploration permits, (as
Venezuelan nationalists had done in 1945), seized oil company records,
forbade the companies to raise their prices, and established the Cuban
Petroleum Institute to carry on exploration, refining, distribution,
marketing, and administrative functions. This move broke the American
monopoly. He also ended the restrictive trading practices which required
^"Cuba," World Petroleum Report, 15 January 1957*
^Ibid., 15 January 1958.
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a Cuban subsidiary of foreign firms to only market crude provided by the
parent company. This move opened the door to using American owned retail
outlets to market Soviet crude and made it even more necessary for the
firms to retaliate.
The fact that the effort of the oil companies to "precipitate a
crisis" for the Cuban economy, and therefore its government, began
several months before the sugar embargo suggests that the oil firms
initiated the American destabilization effort. In 1959 the oil firms
began to manipulate Cuba's crude supplies. After Castro fought back.
President Eisenhower, on July 9» I960, stopped the purchase of 700,000
tons of Cuban sugar. That same summer the oil companies intensified
their efforts against Castro with an oil boycott. The American Govern¬
ment followed in the fall with a general embargo on all shipments to
Cuba. The oil firms, then, played a key leadership role in the destabi¬
lization program.
Castro appears to have appreciated the role of the oil companies
in causing Cuba's economic crisis:
One night Fidel told the students that they must be prepared
to tighten up their belts and perhaps even to die. Cuba
might soon become an abandoned island without oil or elec¬
tricity. But she would go back to primitive agriculture
rather than accept loss of sovereignty.^
Another Cuban revolutionary concluded that:
Representatives of Standard Oil and Texaco, of the telephone
and electric companies, the auto distributors and the manu¬
facturers, all had a hand in shaping the Cuban policy. Their
K. S. Karol, Guerrillas in Power: The Course of Cuban Revolution
(New York: Hill & Wang, 1970), pp. 46-47. Karol attributes this state-
ment to Saverino Tutino who was present at the meeting between Castro
and the students.
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slogan was: "what's good for the American business community
is good for Cuba" nothing could be allowed to upset the apple
cart .... 1
Certainly the boycott instituted by the oil companies against
Russia for supplying oil to Cuba confirms their leadership of the
destabilization program. Standard Oil issued a manifesto in which it
declared that:
Standard and its affiliates, in making future commitments to
charter tankers, will take into consideration which owners
are now chartering or selling tankers or hereafter do charter
or sell tankers to the Russians for any trade, and also when
dealing with brokers will take into consideration whether the
brokers are now acting or hereafter do act as intermediaries
in Russian business. Russian business as used in this context
is intended to cover tankers done by Soufracht, Deutschfracht,
and Polfracht (the Soviet, East German, and Polish companies)
and other charters or shippers who handle Black Sea Oil.2
Standard was obviously determined to see that the Cuban economy
collapsed. By attempting to intimidate other firms who were tempted
to trade with Cuba, Standard was demonstrating the lengths to which it
was willing to go to intensify the campaign to remove Cuba's liberal
and nationalistic leadership. In 1957 Cuba consumed 63,000 barrels of
crude per day. Her production was only 1,700 barrels per day. By I960
3
production was down to 500 barrels per day. Without tankers to ship
oil from the Black Sea, Cuba's economy was expected to collapse.
Retaliation measures were imposed on some who defied the Standard
led boycott. An independent tanker which was chartered by the Soviets
lost its Liberian registration:
^Ibid., p. 24. This statement is attributed to an unidentified
officer of the Cuban Communist Party.
2
Tanzer, Political Economy, p. 336. Also see "Cuba," World
Petroleum Report. 15 January 1961.
3
These statistics have been compiled from World Petroleum Report
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Albert J. Rodick, Deputy Commissioner of Maritime Affairs
from the Republic of Liberia, confirmed that the four-year
old vessel was deprived Monday of its "citizenship" and the
right to fly the Liberian flag. ...
The action was partly attributed to a policy position adopted
by the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey).!
Nations also felt the full weight of Standard's strength when
they were tempted to go to Cuba's aid. When the oil firms began to
suspect that Mexico might supply crude to Cuba, the State Department
was convinced to intervene.
The U.S, Ambassador paid a surprise visit to Gutierrez Roland,
head of PEMEX. A Cuban delegation then in Mexico, it was
explained to the Ambassador, consisted only of petroleum
students inspecting PEMEX properties. There was speculation
about another United States—British boycott on Mexico as in
1938, if she sold oil to Cuba.2
The significance of these actions were not lost on the Cuban revo¬
lutionaries. One member of the Castro Regime observed that:
Standard Oil, Texaco, and Shell who were the sole managers of
the Cuban oil business, not content with refusing to refine
"red petroleum" suspended supplies of their own fuel, and
without oil our industries, our transport system, and our
electricity works would have ground to a halt. We no longer
had a choice. We had to take over the management of the re¬
fineries ourselves and ask the Russians to send us their oil
as quickly as possible. Then the American electricity company
refused to use "red petroleum" or to lower its tariffs by the
30% our government demanded. So we had to confiscate the
company as well, in spite of even more violent American threats
about our sugar.3
This observer noted that the refusal by the United States to buy Cuban
for each year between 1956 and 1962.
^Tanzer, Political Economy. p. 336.
^Ibid.
\arol, Guerrillas in Power, pp. 25-26.
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sugar was a direct consequence of the Cuban Government’s refusal to
surrender to the demands of U.S. oil companies:
Fidel then told them: If you cut our quota pound by pound,
we will nationalize your factories one by one. None of this
did any good. On July 9, I960, President Eisenhower stopped
the purchase of 700,000 tons of sugar, the balance of the an¬
nual quota. A month later, on August 6, I960, Fidel national¬
ized 36 American sugar refineries. (On August 17, I960, the
oil refineries and their marketing outlets were formally
nationalized, although they had been intervened in June,
just days prior to the Eisenhower cutoff of sugar pur¬
chases.) ... .1
After Cuba nationalized the oil companies, the U.S. retaliated by
imposing a general embargo on all shipments to Cuba.
Then in October (I960) the U.S. placed an embargo on the ex¬
port of a host of commodities to Cuba, in the hope of whipping
up the anger of all the large landowners and traders who had
remained on the island. On October 13, I960, our government
responded to this act of aggression by nationalizing approxi¬
mately 400 banks and other concerns. From that date on we
have been our own masters. . . ,2
What had begun as a determined policy on the part of U.S. oil firms to
force their will on the nationalistic Castro Regime, through enforced
suffering of the Cuban people, had resulted in all U.S, interests on
the island being nationalized.
It is important to note that at no time were the U.S, oil companies
asked to refine exclusively Soviet crude. In early I960 Cuba was con¬
suming approximately 65,000 barrels of oil each day. The oil companies
were only asked to take about 11,000 barrels each of Soviet crude or
roughly 50 percent of their capacity. The question which remains is why





The evidence suggests that the oil firms were motivated by a
single concern: protection of their profits regardless of the conse¬
quence for the Cuban people. Oil profits and long-term investment
security had become closely associated with authoritarian governments
in Latin America. In Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba, the oil companies had
enjoyed their greatest expansion under dictators. Therefore, the liberal
content of the 26th of July movement was resisted for the same reasons
that the Accion Democratica and the Cardenas Socialists were resisted.
Liberals tended to be nationalistic and so increased the government's
participation in oil company profits. Further, the Mexican nationali¬
zations and the Accion Democratica adoption of the 50-50 principle had
set precedents which were soon followed by other oil producing nations.
It became important, therefore, for the oil companies to retaliate
against Cuba's reform programs in order to discourage other producing
states from following suit.
The "demonstration effect" of any nationalistic encroachment on
oil company profits had to be neutralized. A Standard Oil economist
calculated the cost considerations for the companies' actions:
The companies in Cuba had been importing at least 20,000,000
barrels per year, which with a rough profitability of $1.00
per barrel (ignoring refining, transporting, and marketing
profits) would mean that the value of their Cuban facilities
solely as an outlet for crude oil would be $20,000,000 per
year. On the other side of the ledger, Jersey estimated its
investment in Cuba at $62 million, while that of Texaco and
Shell together was about $70 million; if these investments
yielded an average profit of 10% per year, this would be only
$13 million per year, or considerably less than the profits
derived from the sale of crude oil. Moreover, once the prin¬
ciple of accepting Soviet crude oil was established, the com¬
panies could further lose some $30 million per year on their
122
imports into India, to say nothing of the cost in other
countries.1
Although accepting 100 percent Soviet crude could still
a 10 percent profit margin and could have been a considerable
the weak Cuban economy, the oil firms would not go along with





their relationships with the "majors":
There was certainly no doubt that Russian offers were neatly
selected to offer the major companies the maximum of embarrass¬
ment—though they were quite often markets where the majors
were entrenched with practically no other competition; ...
Cuba was one such market. India was another; one by one,
others have followed. These generally have been underdeveloped
countries, short of foreign exchange, strong nationalists, and
nursing suspicions of their established suppliers as relics
of colonialism or dollar diplomacy. But there is another
distinct and very important group of buyers of Soviet oil,
led by Italy, Japan, and Scandanavia. These are among the
most cold-blooded of all oil importers. They have always had
a sharp eye for a bargain and a reluctance to tie themselves
to any single group of suppliers.^
Mexico had been the torchbearer of the oil producing under¬
developed world in 1938 when it nationalized the oil industry. Venezuela
was the torchbearer in 1946 when she imposed the 50-50 principle. In
i960, Cuba was the torchbearer of the oil importing underdeveloped world
when she insisted that she had a right to import crude from sources not
tied to the international majors. Other oil importing nations soon
followed suit:
India conducted a full-scale inquiry into the price of oil in
1961 .... In Pakistan, too, the government undertook directly
Vanzer, Political Economy, p. 330.
2
J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments (London: Faber
and Faber, 1962), p. 26.
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to participate in the industry in Ceylon, set up a state oil
company to market oil and eventually expropriated the facili¬
ties of the . . . international majors . . . .In Africa, the
governments went little further than occasionally to obtain
shares in refining facilities, although offers by E I of state
participation were usually accepted.!
Since Cuba was the first underdeveloped nation to press its case
for importing Soviet crude, it became the focal point of the oil indus¬
try's retaliation.
If a stand had to be taken by the oil companies against Soviet
oil, since the United States-Cuban relations were already at
a low point following Batista's ouster/ this was as good a
time and place as any.
Even if at worst the companies' refusal . . . would lead to
expropriation, since it was clear that this would lead in
turn to strong U.S. retaliation, such a sequence of events
might have been viewed as a good warning to India and other
countries.2
The ultimate goal of the destabilization program against the
nationalistic regime of Fidel Castro was to whip up sufficient public
discontent and suffering within Cuba to force Castro from office. The
same tactics had been used against Huerta in 1913 and against Betancourt
in 1945 and I960. The oil companies deliberately imposed hardships on
the people of all three countries to force them to accept governments
loyal to American interests. This undemocratic effort had the full aid
and sympathy of the United States Government which considers itself to
be the most democratic nation on earth.
The destabilization program aimed at Cuba failed because other
nations were willing to come to Cuba's aid. The Soviets provided crude.
^Edith T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing
Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1968), pp. 81-82.
2
Tanzer, Political Economy. p. 332.
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Scandanavian and Greek ship owners provided the transport. Mexico,
Argentina, and Venezuela provided technicians. Many other nations
bowed to America's pressure and severed relations with Cuba. The Cuban
experience clearly demonstrates that a few key relationships with
nations who are willing, for whatever reason, to decide their own
foreign policies is sufficient to defeat a strong nation's economic
destabilization program against a much smaller country.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM VS. THE MULTINATIONALS
At the outset of this paper a number of questions were asked con¬
cerning the nature of oil company activities in oil producing, develop)-
ing states. What has preceded is an accurate reflection of the com¬
panies* manipulations in areas not directly related to the production,
refining, transporting, or marketing of petroleum products. In each
of the three states studied, political developments reached crisis pro¬
portions and the societies underwent traumatic social revolutions. In
reviewing the oil companies* manipulations, these revolutionary develop¬
ments provided the axis around which this effort has rotated.
In Chapter two, we reviewed the developments leading up to the 1910
Mexican Revolution and found that that revolution was a development con¬
sistent with democratic and nationalist tendencies to eradicate many of
the injustices suffered by a majority of the people. We found that the
oil companies had contributed in a significant way to the maintenance of
repressive pressures in Mexico long before the revolution got underway.
Therefore, they were a part of the exploitative system against which
the masses rebelled.
An important development in the Mexican Revolution was the companies*
successful redirection of the revolution from its militant nationalistic
position to one which served their international needs. This development
proved highly encouraging for the companies and set the example for mani¬
pulation techniques elsewhere. It was successfully discovered that
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conservative elements within a revolutionary force are often highly
amenable to compromise. This is especially so on nationalistic and
peasant reform questions.
Interestingly, after the oil companies had successfully maneuvered
to get their way in Mexico, there soon developed an occasion for with¬
drawing. The discovery of huge new domestic pools in the United States
together with the availability of large Mexican supplies created the
need to cut back production in order to maintain high prices. Mexico
had been the scene of extensive maneuvering by the companies to gain
control over the oil fields. It could logically be expected that some
effort would have been made to maintain the good will of the Mexican
government by prorationing the cutbacks between U.S. and Mexican oil
fields. This would have helped the Mexican Government maintain its sol¬
vency. However, Mexico was abandoned and her oil pools allowed to be
spoiled by salt water incursion. Meanwhile, production in the United
States was reaching record levels. The distinct impression given by
the U.S. companies was that Mexico had been brazenly pillaged for nothing
more than short term capital gain. After the Mexican Government seized
the initiative and nationalized the oil industry, the companies complained
as if they had all along been the unselfish protectors of Mexico's na¬
tional interests.
A justifiable criticism of the American system of private enter¬
prise is that it has to support the companies in a great many of these
actions or face dependence on foreign suppliers. However, it appears
that the companies are often as heartless towards the American public as
they are towards foreigners. In the 1920's when production was cutback
in Mexico, so as to reduce the availability of petroleum products, the
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companies claimed the inminent exhaustion of all supplies. This same
claim has been repeated at strategic points since then with equal credi-
bility.
In Chapter three we find the oil firms aligned with the same repres¬
sive elements in Venezuela as they had been in Mexico. We also find
direct U.S. Government support for these same elements. Again, consis¬
tent with Mexico, the companies resisted and inhibited nationalistic
developments. The regimes most favored by the companies were also the
most violent in their denial of basic political and economic rights.
Conversely, the regimes least favored by the oil companies were the ones
most persistent in their economic and political reforms. Since the oil
companies* situation improved and worsened from their points of view when
dictators and democratic (respectively) regimes came to power, a correla¬
tion can be established between the companies' drive for more profits
and their opposition to liberal movements.
In Venezuela we find that the companies implicitly acknowledged
the illegality of their concessions by demanding that those concessions
be legitimized in return for their acceptance of the "50-50" concept.
Further, they acted against Venezuela's national interest by inhibiting
the Accion Democratica program of economic reform. This was especially
in evidence after 1958 when the civilian regime returned to power. Not
only did the companies cut back on national oil income by cutting pro¬
duction, they also discouraged others from investing in Venezuela. These
actions were designed to precipitate a crisis for the civilian rulers
and make the citizenry fearful of civilian leadership.
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In Chapter four we found that the companies reacted to nationalist
forces in Cuba in much the same way they had in Mexico and Venezuela.
They were especially intransigent in Cuba, however. When this intransig¬
ence was confronted by the rigid determination of Fidel Castro, a unique
chapter in the history of international oil trading occurred. Certainly
the companies* economists would have warned them of the dire financial
situation of Cuba in 1958. Equally obvious was the need for drastic
action to correct the problem. What Castro demanded was nothing more
than had been achieved by more developed trading partners of the inter¬
national majors; he wanted to ease his balance of payments by bartering
for cheaper Soviet crude. The companies would still have profited, as
would have the Cubans and the Soviets.
The companies had three basic options in the Cuban case: First,
they could have agreed to refine the Soviet crude and thereby signalled
to the rest of the world that they were willing to accept a temporary
decline in profits in the interest of supporting the nation building
process. Second, they could have refused to process Soviet oil but
granted Cuba some form of relief through lower prices. This would have
earned the companies a measure of goodwill. It could also have led to
other nations with balance of payments problems seeking similar relief or
Soviet trading arrangements, and had a wide spread effect on the companies'
profits. However, in light of the facts that the Soviets could not have
serviced indefinitely the international market of poor nations, nor could
the Soviets be forever prevented from trading with developing and de¬
veloped non-communist states, such a concession by the firms would have
aided nation and market building. Further, since the United States is
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presently easing its relationship with the Soviets, a decision in I960
not to oppose the Soviet-Cuban deal could have made detente possible
much earlier. Such a development fifteen years ago could have saved
resources in all three countries by reducing the need for military
build ups. Nevertheless, the companies, with the aid and sympathy of the
United States Government, opted for the third alternative. They opposed
the deal and sought to punish Cuba for seeking an independent solution
to her problems. In so doing, the companies and the United States
Government gave testimony to the absurdity of excess greed and excess
ant i-comimjn i sm.
Three types of conclusions will be presented in this section: The
first deals with the general relationship which became evident during
the course of this research between the oil companies' activities and
the political environment in which they operated and/or attempted to
create. The second will focus on the dynamics of the nation-building
process as they relate to this study. The third set of conclusions will
answer those questions which remain unanswered and relate to the oil
companies' impact on the nation-building process.
The political environment in which the companies operated has been
one of intense change marked by periods of uneasy stability. The change
is evidenced by persistent efforts from the lower classes to ease their
oppression. It is also represented by nationalist efforts to substitute
national for foreign interests in the order of priorities. The stable
periods—from the companies' point of view—are represented by the rise
to power of strong authoritarian rulers or dictators. The evidence sug¬
gests that these are the periods preferred by the oil giants.
In Mexico, the oil companies enjoyed unparalleled growth under
dictators and suffered unparalleled defeats at the hands of democratic.
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nationalist regimes. Porfirio Diaz seized power initially through
unconstitutional means. He disallowed serious political opposition,
and violently suppressed mass efforts at reform. However, he granted
ownership of the subsoil to the foreign petroleum companies in violation
of five centuries of legal tradition. Other Mexican dictators also
favored one group of oil interests or another. After 1930, however,
Mexican nationalists rose to power. One such nationalist initiated the
nationalization of the foreign oil properties. He was Lazaro Cardenas.
Between Diaz and Cardenas, the companies maneuvered desperately for
continued control over Mexico's oil resources. When the end came, the
companies initiated a half-hearted boycott in order to punish Mexico.
Similar developments occurred in Venezuela and Cuba. The tyranny
of Juan Vincente Gomez coincided with the oil companies' initial entry
and expansion in Venezuela. Further, the penetration of Venezuela by
the companies resulted in prime agricultural land being transferred to
the companies. As a consequence, food production seriously declined and
there was large scale migration from the rural to the urban areas. Since
the cities offered no corresponding relief, the situation for large num¬
bers of Venezuelans deteriorated with the coming of the oil industry.
In 19^5» a democratic regime came to power by unconstitutional
means. It soon moved to legitimize itself via the ballot, however. It
was from this regime that the companies had their greatest challenge.
The democratic government incurred the hostility of the companies by
claiming half the profits of the oil industry, and by calling for the
establishment of a national oil company. It also pursued a policy of
refusing to grant any new oil concessions to foreign firms.
The Batista dictatorship in Cuba resulted in the companies gaining
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a series of "incentives" which were previously unmatched in Cuba's his¬
tory. They ranged from long term tax exemptions to government finan¬
cing of exploratory activity—the most costly and risky part of the oil
business. When the liberal nationalists under Fidel Castro came to
power, the companies saw their properties nationalized. A logical con¬
clusion which can be drawn is that dictators are more sympathetic to
the interests of the oil companies than are nationalistic, democratic
regimes.
There is a close correlation between maximizing political influence
and minimizing competition. In Mexico, the U.S. oil interests were the
first to gain hegemony. However, as Diaz became more and more endeared
towards the British, British oil companies began to take the majority of
Mexico's oil. After Diaz was ousted with the support of American oil
firms, the United States' take from Mexican oil fields became greatest.
In Venezuela, the British oil firms were the first to achieve hegemony.
Consequently, their oil production was greatest. After the United States
assisted Gomez in taking power from Castro, American oil interests claimed
the lion's share of Venezuelan oil production. U.S. political interests
had been unchallenged in Cuba since the turn of the century. Naturally,
U.S. oil companies held a monopoly on the petroleum market there. In
view of the fact that the same U.S. companies were involved in each coun¬
try, it is reasonable to conclude that the motivation for the companies'
efforts to influence political developments in oil producing states is
to insure their control over the oil resources.
An important conclusion can be drawn about the weakness of revolu¬
tionary struggles from the experiences of Mexico and Cuba. In both cases
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the struggles extended over a considerable period of time and enconv-
passed liberal and conservative factions. The Cuban revolution to
which reference is made, is the movement at the end of the 19th century.
In both instances, the conservative arms proved willing to compromise
with the opposition on issues which were fundamental to the liberal
arm. In both cases, the conservative wing did in fact enter into
settlements with the opposition before the nationalists and the liberals
demands were met. By contrast the 1945 coup in Venezuela did not afford
an opportunity for coalitions to be formed until after the leadership
change had been accomplished. Further, the 1958 Cuban revolution built
its momentum in the rural areas where the conservatives were scarcely
represented. They therefore had no real opportunity to usurp the move¬
ment. The implication of these facts is that a liberal or nationalist
revolution can best succeed if it does not allow the conservative ele¬
ments to share the leadership of the movement.
It is instructive that dictators loyal to one oil company are often
ousted by dictators loyal to another company. This occurred in Mexico
with Diaz, Madero and Huerta. In Venezuela it occurred with Cipriano
Castro. The implication is that dictators can be as expendable as
nationalists, if they support the wrong oil interests. Dictators are
in fact more vulnerable than are nationalists because they are less
popular, and because they often depend on foreign support to stay in
power. This helps to explain why dictators who are able to hold power
for extended periods do so only with the support of the military and
foreign support for that military. The implication is that when Ameri¬
can oil companies wish to show support for a dictator they may do this
by inducing the U.S. Government to provide equipment and training for
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the dictator's armed forces. Likewise, when a dictator is in disfavor,
an effective means of removing him is to cut off military aid and begin
supplying his opposition.
It can be easily seen that foreign operations are essential func¬
tions of the American based multinational oil companies. Without foreign
sources, the domestic reserves would soon be exhausted. American indus¬
tries would be paralyzed and the ordinary worker would suffer for lack
of work and products to consume. Without the American multinational oil
companies, others would no doubt rise to fill the void. Therefore, why
not U.S. owned oil companies?
Criticism of the industry should not be directed at its size and
power but rather at how that power and size is used. The efforts of the
companies to force Cuba and other poor nations to purchase higher priced
oil comes close to international gangsterism. The interference in the
domestic political affairs of another country is justified only if other
nations are allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the United
States. The combined preoccupation with profit maximization and anti¬
communism has led to gross misapplications of both power and resources.
These abuses have been most pronounced in developing states.
The dynamics of the nation building process focused on in this
paper have been the competition between rival forces for hegemony in
developing states. These forces can be divided into two categories:
authoritarian and anti-nationalistic, and democratic and nationalistic.
The authoritarian regimes studied have been anti-nationalistic because
they have generally placed the interests of foreign investors above
those of the citizenry. Since authoritarian rulers have also been
dictators they are considered herein to be undemocratic. The democratic
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regimes have generally been civilian led and have tended to respect the
wishes of the electorate. They have also placed primary emphasis on
national requirements. As such, they are herein considered nationalis¬
tic.
The Fidel Castro regime is a notable exception to these rules.
Whereas it does fully qualify as a nationalistic government, it does not
meet the criteria for being completely democratic. Other such cases
have also been identified in this paper. In general, however, it can
be concluded that the forces for nation-building with which the oil com¬
panies have identified less have been nationalism.
The primary supplier of dictatorial rulers have been the military.
In each country studied, the senior military officers have been the most
closely aligned with foreign oil interests of all the social groups.
Military rulers have undertaken the suppression of nationalistic and
democratic movements. It cannot be taken for granted, then, that a
national armed force will necessarily be nationalistic.
There is sufficient evidence to warrant questioning the value of
the multinational oil firms to the nation-building process. The experi¬
ences of each country studied reveals a pattern where hard won nationalis¬
tic and democratic gains are followed by periods of repression which are
in turn followed by further steps forward. Significantly, the oil com¬
panies* attitudes have vacillated between full support for repression to
open hostility for nationalism. The oil companies have extraordinary
power which they have used mercilessly. They demonstrated in both Mexico
and Venezuela that they could influence events more effectively than
could the masses of the people. In Mexico this was demonstrated through
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their successful subordination of the revolution to their own aims. In
Venezuela, they demonstrated that they could strongly influence other
investors' desire to come there.
The Cuban case is the best example, however. The boycott led by
the oil firms was highly successful in temporarily dissuading larger
crude outlets in India and elsewhere from trading with the Soviets.
The companies were able to preserve other markets thanks to the severity
of their punishment of Cuba.
It is a primary conclusion of this paper that the U.S. based multi¬
national oil companies have consistently engaged in illegal and anti-
nationalistic activities in developing states and that these activities
are among the primary causes for Third World disenchantment with the
United States. American oil firms have engaged both directly and in¬
directly in activities which inhibited the nation-building process as
defined in the opening chapter of this paper. The distribution of poli¬
tical freedoms has been inhibited by the oil companies through their
support of repressive political regimes. The right of host country
citizens to select their own leadership has been interfered with by
the companies' efforts to elevate compromised politicians into power
and by their support for regimes which forcefully take power. Further,
the American Government ignored the democratic process when it inter¬
vened in Mexico, called for a "Venezuelan Diaz," and encouraged Batista
to seize power in Cuba.
Each time the companies encouraged the United States Government to
intervene in their behalf, they interfered with the sovereignty of the
host country. In the initial years of this century, the sovereignty of
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Mexico and Cuba was seldom acknowledged. In Venezuela and Cuba, as
well as in Mexico, the economic destabilization programs of the companies
severely interfered with the national leadership's ability to undertake
nationalistic social reforms, and thus inhibited the nation-building
process.
The challenge facing the multinational oil companies in the future
will be developing a modus vivendi with nationalism, and the economic and
political reforms which Third World countries are likely to initiate. A
question which remains, then, is can the oil firms achieve such an
accommodation with nationalism and still survive? Historical evidence
suggests that they cannot. Profit maximization is an inexorable law of
capitalism. This requires protected markets (which is what the oil com¬
panies attempted to do in Cuba) and guaranteed supplies (which is what
the firms sought in Mexico and Venezuela). If Third World raw materials
remain under the control of foreign private capitalists, it is unlikely
that they will ever be used for any purpose other than those of the
owners. Under such circumstances, underdeveloped countries will continue
to be faced with the necessity of choosing between serving their own or
foreign interests. The history of both class and nationalist struggles
throughout the world suggests that ultimately the private foreign in¬
terests—such as the oil multinationals—will be displaced from their
position of hegemony.
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